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Abstract
Prior work on the omplexity of bribery assumes that the bribery happens simulta-
neously, and that the briber has full knowledge of all voters' votes. But neither of those
assumptions always holds. In many real-world settings, votes ome in sequentially, and
the briber may have a use-it-or-lose-it moment to deide whether to bribe/alter a given
vote, and at the time of making that deision, the briber may not know what votes
remaining voters are planning on asting.
In this paper, we introdue a model for, and initiate the study of, bribery in suh
an online, sequential setting. We show that even for eletion systems whose winner-
determination problem is polynomial-time omputable, an online, sequential setting
may vastly inrease the omplexity of bribery, in fat jumping the problem up to om-
pleteness for high levels of the polynomial hierarhy or even PSPACE. On the other
hand, we show that for some natural, important eletion systems, suh a dramati

An extended-abstrat version of this paper will appear in the Proeedings of the 17th Conferene on
Theoretial Aspets of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2019) [HHR℄.
y
Supported in part by NSF grant DUE-1819546 and a Renewed Researh Stay grant from the Alexander
von Humboldt Foundation. Work done in part while on sabbatial visits to ETH-Zurih and the University
of Dusseldorf.
z
Supported in part by a Renewed Researh Stay grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
Work done in part while on sabbatial visits to ETH-Zurih and the University of Dusseldorf.
x
Supported in part by DFG grant RO 1202/14-2.
1
omplexity inrease does not our, and we pinpoint the omplexity of their bribery
problems in the online, sequential setting.
Key words: bribery, omputational soial hoie, online algorithms, quantier assign-
ment, sequential eletions.
1 Introduction
In omputational soial hoie theory, the three most studied types of attaks on eletions
are bribery, ontrol, and manipulation, and the models of those that are studied seek to
model the analogous real-world ations.
Suh studies are typially arried out for the model in whih all the voters vote simul-
taneously. That sometimes is the ase in the real world. But it also is sometimes the ase
that the voters vote in sequene|in what is sometimes alled a roll-all eletion.
That type of setting has been relatively reently introdued and studied for ontrol and
manipulation|in partiular, studies have been done of both ontrol and manipulation in
the so-alled online, sequential setting [HHR14, HHR17a, HHR17b℄. In the present paper,
we study the omplexity of, and algorithms for, the online, sequential ase of bribery.
Briey put, we are studying the ase where the voting order (and the voter weights
and ost of bribing eah voter) is known ahead of time to the briber. But at the moment
a voter seeks to vote, the voter's planned vote is revealed to the briber, who then has a
use-it-or-lose-it hane to bribe the voter, by paying the voter's bribe-prie (and doing so
allows that vote to be hanged to any vote the briber desires).
The problem we are studying is the omplexity of that deision. In partiular, how hard
is it to deide whether under optimal play on the part of the briber there is an ation for the
briber towards the urrent voter suh that under ontinued future optimal play by the briber
(in the fae of all future revelations of unknown information being pessimal), the briber
an reah a ertain goal (e.g., having one of his or her two favorite andidates win; or not
having any of his or her three most hated andidates win). (See, within the Preliminaries,
Setion 3.2|and espeially its nal three paragraphs|for a detailed disussion of issues
regarding the model, the varying forms the osts in bribery an take (from atual dollars
to time or eort spent to risk aepted), and the fat that, despite the typial assoiations
with the word \bribery," in many settings bribery is not modeling immoral or evil ats.)
The following list presents the setion struture of our results, and mentions some of
the novel proof approahes needed to obtain them.
1. Setions 4.1 and 4.2 establish our upper bounds|of PSPACE and the 
p
2k+1
level of
the polynomial hierarhy|on online bribery (i.e., online, sequential bribery, but we
will for the rest of the paper and espeially in our problem names often omit the word
\sequential" when the word \online" is present) in the general ase and in the ase
of being restrited to at most k bribes.
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The 
p
2k+1
upper bounds are far less straightforward than upper bounds in the poly-
nomial hierarhy typially are. Sine bribes an our on any voter (until one runs
out of allowed bribes), and so a yes-no deision has to be made, even for the ase
of at most k bribes, there an be long strings of alternating existential and universal
hoies in the natural alternating Turing mahine programs for the problems. And so
there is the threat that one an prove merely a PSPACE upper bound.
However, in Setion 4.2.1, we prove a more general result about alternating Turing
mahines that, while perhaps having many alternations between existential and uni-
versal hoies, make most of them in a \boring" way. Basially, we show that in the
relevant setting one an pull muh of the existential guessing upstream and make
it external to the alternating Turing mahine, and indeed one an do so in suh a
way that one transforms the problem into the disjuntion of a polynomial number of
uniformly generated questions about ations of alternating Turing mahines eah of
whih itself has at most 2k+1 alternation bloks. From that, we establish the needed
upper bound, both for the relevant abstrat ase of alternating Turing mahines and
for our online bribery problems.
2. Setion 4.3 proves that there are eletion systems with simple winner problem
suh that eah of the abovementioned upper-bounds is tight, i.e., that PSPACE-
ompleteness holds or 
p
2k+1
-ompleteness holds.
There is a substantial, novel hallenge that the proof here has to overome. Namely,
to prove for example 
p
2k+1
-hardness, we generally need to redue from quantied
boolean formulas with partiular quantiers applying to partiular variables. How-
ever, in online bribery, the briber is allowed to hoose where to do the bribing. This in
eet orresponds to having a formula with lusters of quantied variables, yet suh
that we as we attempt to prove theorems related to these strutures don't have ontrol
over whih quantiers are existential and whih are universal. Rather, in eet what
the online bribery setting will test is whether there exists an assignment (onsistent
with the number of bribes allowed|whih limits the number of existential quantiers
one an set) of eah quantier to be either existential or universal, suh that for that
quantier-assignment the formula evaluates as true. (This is not at all the same as
quantier exhange; in quantier exhange, the exhanged quantiers move around
together with their assoiated variables.)
However, we handle this by showing how to onstrut a new formula that builds in
protetion against this setting. In partiular, we note that one an take a quantied
boolean formula and turn it into one suh that, in this Wild West setting of quantier
assignment, the new formula an be made true by a legal (i.e., having at most as
many 9 quantiers as the original formula) quantier assignment exatly if the original
formula is true.
3
3. In Setion 5, we look at the omplexity of online bribery for various natural systems.
We show that for both Plurality and Approval, it holds that pried, weighted online
bribery is NP-omplete, whereas all other problem variants of online bribery are in P.
This also shows that bribery an be harder than online bribery for natural systems.
In addition, we provide omplete dihotomy theorems that distinguish NP-hard from
easy ases for all our online bribery problems for soring rules and additionally we
show that Veto eletions, even with three andidates, have even higher lower bounds
for weighted online bribery, namely P
NP[1℄
-hardness.
2 Related Work
Our paper's general area is omputational soial hoie, in whih studying the omplexity
of eletion and preferene aggregation problems and manipulative attaks on them is a en-
tral theme. There are many exellent surveys and book hapters on omputational soial
hoie [BCE13, Rot16, BCE
+
16℄, and omputational soial hoie and omputational om-
plexity have a long history of lose, mutually beneial interation (see the survey [Hem18℄).
The prior papers most related to our work are the papers that dened and studied the
omplexity of online ontrol [HHR17a, HHR17b℄, of online manipulation [HHR14℄, and of
(regular) bribery [FHH09℄. Partiularly important among those is online manipulation, as
we will show onnetions/inheritane between online manipulation and our model. We also
will show onnetions/inheritane between (regular) manipulation and our model. Regular
manipulation was introdued by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trik [BTT89℄ in the unweighted
ase and by Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [CSL07℄ in the weighted ase.
The existing work most losely related to our work on the eet on alternating Turing
mahines and formulas of limits on existential ations is the work on online voter on-
trol [HHR17b℄, though the issues takled here are dierent and harder.
The work of Xia and Conitzer [XC10℄ (see also [DE10, Slo93, DP01℄) that denes and
explores the Stakelberg voting game is also about sequential voting, although unlike this
paper their analysis is game-theoreti and is about manipulation rather than bribery. Se-
quential (and related types of) voting have also been studied in an axiomati way [Ten04℄
and using Markov deision proesses [PP13℄, though neither of those works fouses on issues
of bribery. Poole and Rosenthal [PR97℄ provide a history of roll-all voting.
Our approah to the briber's goal, whih is assuming worst-ase revelations of informa-
tion, is inspired by the approah used in the area known as online algorithms [BE98℄.
Interesting work that is related|though somewhat distantly|in avor to our study is
the paper of Chevaleyre et al. [CLM
+
12℄ on the addition of andidates. They also fous on
the moment at whih one has to make a key deision, in their ase whether all of a group
of potential additional andidates should be added.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 Basics
P is the lass of deision problems in deterministi polynomial time. NP is the lass of
deision problems in nondeterministi polynomial time. For eah k  0, 
p
k
is the lass
of deision problems in the kth  level of the polynomial hierarhy [MS72, Sto76℄, e.g.,

p
0
= P, 
p
1
= NP, and 
p
2
= NP
NP
(i.e., the lass of sets aepted by nondeterministi
polynomial-time orale Turing mahines given unit-ost aess to an NP orale). For eah
k  0, 
p
k
= fL j L 2 
p
k
g, e.g., 
p
0
= 
p
0
= P, 
p
1
= oNP, and 
p
3
= oNP
NP
NP
.
The polynomial-hierarhy level 
p
2
= P
NP
is the lass of sets aepted by deterministi
polynomial-time orale Turing mahines given unit-ost aess to an NP orale, and P
NP[1℄
is the same lass restrited to one orale query per input.
We say that A 
p
m
B (A polynomial-time many-one redues to B) exatly if there is a
polynomial-time omputable funtion f suh that (8x)[x 2 A () f(x) 2 B℄.
Fact 3.1. For eah omplexity lass C 2 f
p
0
;
p
1
;
p
1
;
p
2
;
p
2
; : : : g, C is losed downwards
under polynomial-time many-one redutions, i.e., (B 2 C ^ A 
p
m
B) =) A 2 C.
Eah of the lasses mentioned in Fat 3.1 is even losed downwards under what is
known as polynomial-time disjuntive truth-table reduibility [LLS75℄. Disjuntive truth-
table reduibility an be dened as follows. We say that A 
p
dtt
B (A polynomial-time
disjuntive truth-table redues to B) exatly if there is a polynomial-time omputable
funtion f suh that, for eah x, it holds that (a) f(x) outputs a list of 0 or more strings, and
(b) x 2 A if and only if at least one string output by f(x) is a member of B. (Polynomial-
time many-one redutions are simply the speial ase of polynomial-time disjuntive truth-
table redutions where the polynomial-time disjuntive truth-table redution's output-list
funtion is required to always ontain exatly one element.)
Fact 3.2. For eah omplexity lass C 2 f
p
0
;
p
1
;
p
1
;
p
2
;
p
2
; : : : g, C is losed downwards
under polynomial-time disjuntive truth-table redutions, i.e., (B 2 C ^ A 
p
dtt
B) =)
A 2 C.
The above fat is obvious for P, and is easy to see and well known for NP and oNP
(for example, the results follow immediately from the result of Selman [Sel82℄ that NP
is losed downwards under so-alled positive Turing redutions). The results for the NP
and oNP ases relativize (as Selman's mentioned result's proof learly relativizes), and
that gives (namely, by relativizing the NP and oNP ases by omplete sets for NP, NP
NP
,
et.) the laims for the higher levels of the polynomial hierarhy (in fat, it gives something
even stronger, sine it gives downward losure under disjuntive truth-table redutions that
themselves are relativized, but we won't need that stronger version in this paper).
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Sine all the many-one and disjuntive truth-table redutions disussed in the paper will
be polynomial-time ones, we heneforth will sometimes skip the words \polynomial-time"
when speaking of a polynomial-time many-one or disjuntive truth-table redution.
A set L is said to be (polynomial-time many-one) hard for a lass C (for short, \L is C-
hard") exatly if (8B 2 C)[B 
p
m
L℄. If in addition L 2 C, we say that L is polynomial-time
many-one omplete for C, or simply that L is C-omplete.
An (unweighted) eletion system E takes as input a voter olletion V and a andidate
set C, suh that eah element of V ontains a voter name and a preferene order over the
andidates in C; and for us in this paper preferene orders are always total orders, exept
when we are speaking of approval voting where the preferene orders are bit-vetors from
f0; 1g
kCk
.
1
The eletion system maps from that to a (possibly nonproper) subset of C, often
alled the winner set. We often will all eah element of V a vote, though as is ommon
sometimes we will use the term vote to refer just to the preferene order. We often will
use the variable names , 
1
, 
2
, . . . , 
i
for total orders. We allow eletion systems to, on
some inputs, have no winners.
2
For a given (unweighted, simultaneous) eletion system, E , the (unweighted) winner (aka
the winner-determination) problem (in the unweighted ase) is the set fhC; V; i j  2 C ^
 is a winner of the eletion (C; V ) under eletion system Eg.
For a given (unweighted [si℄, simultaneous) eletion system, E , the winner problem in
the weighted [si℄ ase will be the set of all strings hC; V; i suh that C is a andidate set,
V is a set of weighted (via binary nonnegative integers as weights) votes (eah onsisting of
a voter name and a total order over C),  2 C, and in the unweighted eletion reated from
this by replaing eah w-weighted vote in V with w unweighted opies of that same vote,
 is a winner in that eletion under the (unweighted) eletion system E . For an eletion
system E , it is lear that if the winner problem in the weighted ase is in P, then so is the
winner problem in the unweighted ase. However, there are eletion systems E for whih
the onverse fails. The above approah to dening the weighted winner problem is natural
and appropriate for the eletion systems disussed in this paper. However, see Appendix A
for a disussion of the strengths and weaknesses of using this approah to the weighted
winner problem in other settings, and for more disussion of the laims in this paragraph.
1
For the rest of the preliminaries, we'll always speak of total orders as the preferene orders' type, with
it being impliit that when later in the paper we speak of and prove results about approval voting, all suh
plaes will taitly be viewed as speaking of bit-vetors.
2
Although in soial hoie this is often disallowed, as has been disussed previously, see, e.g., [FHH16,
Footnote 3℄, artiially exluding the ase of no winners is unnatural, and many papers in omputational
soial hoie allow this ase. A typial real-world motivating example is that in Baseball Hall of Fame votes,
having no indutees in a given year is a natural outome that has at times ourred.
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3.2 Online Bribery in Sequential Elections
This paper is about the study of online bribery in sequential eletions. In this setting,
we are|this is the sequential part|assuming that the voters vote in a well-known order,
sequentially, with eah asting a ballot that expresses preferenes over all the andidates.
And we are assuming|this is the online part|that the attaker, alled \the briber," as
eah new vote omes in has his or her one and only hane to bribe that voter, i.e., to alter
that vote to any vote of the briber's hoie.
Bribery has aspets of both the other standard types of eletoral attaks: bribery is
like manipulation in that one hanges votes and it is like (voter) ontrol in that one is
deiding on a set of voters (in the ase of bribery, whih ones to bribe). Reeting this,
our model follows as losely as possible the relevant parts of the existing models that study
manipulation and ontrol in online settings [HHR14, HHR17b, HHR17a℄. In partiular, we
will follow insofar as possible both the model of, and the notation of the model of, the
paper by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR17b℄ that introdued the study
of online voter ontrol in sequential eletions. In partiular, we will follow the avor of
their model of ontrol by deleting voters, exept here the key deision is not whether to
delete a given voter, but rather is whether a given voter should be bribed, i.e., whether
the voter's vote should be erased and replaed with a vote supplied by the briber. That
\replae[ment℄" part is more similar to what happens in the study of online manipulation,
whih was modeled and studied by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR14℄.
We will, as both those papers do, fous on a key moment|a moment of deision|and in
partiular on the omplexity of deiding whether there exists an ation the briber an take,
at that moment, suh that doing so will ensure, even under the most hostile of onditions
regarding the information that has not yet been revealed, that the briber will be able to
meet his or her goal.
If u is a voter and C is a andidate set, an eletion snapshot for C and u is speied by
a triple V = (V
<u
; u; V
>u
), whih loosely put is made up of all voters in the order they vote,
eah aompanied in models where there are pries and/or weights with their pries and/or
weights (whih in this paper are assumed to be nonnegative integers oded in binary).
3
In
3
Why do we feel it natural in most situations for the pries and weights to be in binary rather than
unary? A TARK referee, for example, asked whether it was not natural to assume that weights and pries
would always be small, or if not, would always be multiples of some integer that when divided out would
make the remaining numbers small.
Our answer is that both pries and weights in many settings tend to be large, and without any large,
shared-by-all divisor. To see this learly regarding weights, onsider for example the number of shares of
stok the various stokholders hold in some large orporation or the number of residents in eah of the
states of a ountry. Pries too are potentially as rih and varied as are individuals and objets, e.g., in
some settings eah person's bribe-prie might be the exat fair market value of his or her house, or might
be losely related to the number of visits a web site they own has had in the past year.
Pulling bak, we note that requiring pries and weights to be in unary is often tremendously (and arguably
inappropriately) helping the algorithms as to what their omplexity is, sine in eet one is \padding" the
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addition, for eah voter voting before u (namely, the voters in V
<u
), also inluded in this
listing will be the vote they ast (or if they were bribed, what vote was ast for them by
the briber) and whether they were bribed; and for u the listing will also inlude the vote u
will ast unless bribed to ast a dierent vote. So V
>u
is simply a list, in the order they will
vote, of the voters, if any, who ome after u, eah also inluding the voter's prie and/or
weight data if we are in a pried and/or weighted setting. Further, the vote for u and all
the votes in V
<u
must be votes over the andidate set C (and in partiular, in this paper
votes are total orderings of the andidates, e.g., a > b > ).
There is a slight overloading of notation above, in that we have not expliitly listed in
the struture the loation of the mentioned extra data. In fat, our atual denition is that
the rst and last omponents of the 3-tuple V are lists of tuples, and the middle omponent
is a single tuple. Eah of these ontain the appropriate information, as mentioned above.
For example, for pried, weighted bribery:
1. the elements of the list V
<u
will be 5-tuples (v
i
; p
i
; w
i
; 
i
; b
i
) whose omponents re-
spetively are the voter's name, the voter's prie, the voter's weight, the voter's ast
ballot (whih is the voter's original preferene order if the voter was not bribed and
is whatever the voter was bribed into asting if the voter was bribed), and a bit
speifying whether that vote resulted from being bribed,
2. the middle omponent of V will be a tuple that ontains the rst four of those ve
omponents, and
3. the elements of the list V
>u
will ontain the rst three of the above-mentioned ve
omponents.
Similarly, for example, for unpried, unweighted bribery, the three tuple types would re-
spetively have three omponents, two omponents, and one omponent.
As a remaining tidbit of notational overloading, in some plaes we will speak of u when
we in fat mean the voter name that is the rst omponent of the tuple that makes up the
middle tuple of V . That is, we will use u both for a tuple that names u and gives some
of its properties, and as a stand-in for the voter him- or herself. Whih use we mean will
always be lear from ontext.
Let us, with the above in hand, dene our notions of online bribery for sequential
eletions. Settings an independently allow or not allow pries and weights, and so we have
many inputs' sizes as muh as exponentially. But if weighted votes are viewed as indivisible objets|and
that is indeed how they are typially treated in the literature|the right approah indeed is to ode the
weights in binary, and not to give algorithm designers the potentially vastly lowered bar reated by the
padding eet of oding the weights in unary. Indeed, it is known in the study of (nonsequential) bribery
that hanging pries or weights to unary an shift problems' omplexities from NP-hardness to being in
deterministi polynomial time [FHH09, pp. 500{504℄.
Also, people typially do ode natural numbers in binary, not unary.
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four basi types of bribery in our online, sequential model, eah having both onstrutive
and destrutive versions.
In the original paper on nonsequential bribery there were other types of bribery,
e.g., mirobribery, unary-oding, and suint variants [FHH09℄. Many other types have
been studied sine, e.g., nonuniform bribery [Fal08℄ and swap- (and its speial ase
shift-) bribery [EFS09℄ (see also [EF10, BCF
+
16℄). However, for ompatness and sine
they are very natural, this paper fouses ompletely on (standard) bribery in its eight typ-
ial versions (as to pries, weights, and onstrutive/destrutive), exept now in an online,
sequential setting.
Our speiation of these problems as languages is entered around what Hemaspaandra,
Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR14℄ alled a magnifying-glass moment. This is a moment
of deision as to a partiular voter. To apture preisely what information the briber does
and does not have at that moment, and to thus allow us to dene our problems, we dene
a struture that we will all an OBS, whih stands for online bribery setting. An OBS
is dened as a 5-tuple (C; V; ; d; k), where C is a set of andidates; V = (V
<u
; u; V
u<
)
is an eletion snapshot for C and u as disussed earlier;  is the preferene order of the
briber; d 2 C is a distinguished andidate; and k is a nonnegative integer (representing for
unpried ases the maximum number of voters that an be bribed, and for pried ases the
maximum total ost, i.e., the sum of the pries of all the bribed voters).
Given an eletion system E , we dene the online unpried, unweighted bribery prob-
lem, abbreviated by online-E-Bribery, as the following deision problem. The input is an
OBS. And the question is: Does there exist a legal (i.e., not violating whatever bribe limit
holds) hoie by the briber on whether to bribe u (reall that u is speied in the OBS,
namely, via the middle omponent of V ) and, if the hoie is to bribe, of what vote to bribe
u into asting, suh that if the briber makes that hoie then no matter what votes the
remaining voters after u are (later) revealed to have, the briber's goal (the meeting of whih
itself depends on E and will be dened expliitly two paragraphs from now) an be reahed
by the urrent deision regarding u and by using the briber's future (legal-only, of ourse)
deisions (if any), eah being made using the briber's then-in-hand knowledge about what
votes have been ast by then?
Note that this approah is about alternating quantiers. It is asking whether there is
a urrent hoie by the briber suh that for all potential revealed vote values for the next
voter there exists a hoie by the briber suh that for all potential revealed vote values for
the next-still voter there exists a hoie by the briber suh that. . . and so on. . . suh that
the resulting winner set under eletion system E meets the briber's goal. This is a bit more
subtle than it might at rst seem. The briber is ating very powerfully, sine the briber is
represented by existential quantiers. But the briber is not all-powerful in this model. In
partiular, the briber an't see and at on future revelations of vote values; after all, those
are handled by a universal quantier that ours downstream from an existential quantier
that ommits the briber to a partiular hoie.
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In the above we have not dened what \the briber's goal" is, so let us do that now.
W
E
(C;U) will denote the winner set, aording to eletion system E , of the (standard,
nonsequential) eletion (C;U), where C is the andidate set and U is the set of votes. By
the briber's goal we mean, in the onstrutive ase, that if at the end of the above proess
U
0
is the set of votes (some may be the original ones and some may be the result of bribes),
it holds that W
E
(C;U
0
) \ f j  

dg 6= ;, i.e., the winner set inludes some andidate
(possibly itself being d) that the briber likes at least as muh as the briber likes d. In the
destrutive ase, the goal is to ensure that no andidate that the briber hates as muh or
more than the briber hates d belongs to the winner set, i.e., the briber's goal is to ensure
that W
E
(C;U
0
) \ f j d 

g = ;.
4
Above, we have dened both online-E-Bribery and online-E-Destrutive-Bribery. Those
both are in the unpried, unweighted setting. And so as per our denitions, the voters
passed in as part of the problem statement do not ome with or need prie or weight
information.
But our denitions note that for the pried and/or weighted settings, the OBS will
arry the pries and/or weights. And so the same denition text that was used above
denes all the other ases, exept that one must keep in mind for the pried ases that
when the \bribery limit" is mentioned one must instead speak of the \bribery budget,"
and in the weighted ases the winner set W is of ourse dened in terms of the weighted
version of the given voting system (whih must, for that to be meaningful, have a well-
dened notion of what its weighted version is; Setion 3.1 provides that notion for all
systems in this paper, see also Appendix A for further disussion). Thus, we also have
taitly dened the six problems online-E-$Bribery, online-E-Destrutive-$Bribery, online-
E-Weighted-Bribery, online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery, online-E-Weighted-$Bribery,
and online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery.
For an unpried online bribery problem, we will postpend the problem name with a \[k℄"
to dene the version where as part of the problem denition itself the bribery limit is|in
ontrast with the above unpried problem|not part of the input but rather is xed to be
the value k. For example, online-E-Bribery[k℄ denotes the unpried, unweighted bribery
problem where the number of voters who an be bribed is set not by the problem input
4
In eah of these two ases, although we have in the problem statement used an order , that order
 really is merely being used to determine what set of andidates to (onstrutive ase) try to get one of
into the winner set, or to (destrutive ase) try to keep all of out of the winner set. So one might wonder
why we don't simply pass in suh a set, rather than passing in an ordering. The answer is that for the
version of the problem that this paper is studying, namely the deision version, either way would be ne.
However, allowing an order to be passed in keeps our approah in harmony with the approah of earlier
work [HHR14, HHR17b, HHR17a℄, whih made that hoie beause if one studies the optimization version
of the problem|e.g., in the onstrutive ase trying to nd the most preferred andidate within  that the
briber an ensure will be a winner|a set does not bring in enough information to frame the problem but
an order does. Our approah is also following those earlier papers in that it is using an upper segment of
the order for the onstrutive ase and a lower segment of the order for the destrutive ase (see [HHR17b,
seond paragraph of Footnote 4℄ for more disussion of why that hoie is most natural).
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but rather is limited to be at most k. Note that in eah of the \[k℄" variants, we taitly
are altering the denition of OBS from its standard 5-tuple, (C; V; ; d; k), to instead the
4-tuple (C; V; ; d); that is beause for these ases, the k is xed as part of the general
problem itself, rather than being a variable part of the individual instanes. For pried
\[k℄" variants, there will be both a limit (being a variable part of the input) on the total
prie of the bribes and a xed as part of the general problem itself limit on the number of
voters who an be bribed.
Of ourse, there are some immediate relationships that hold between these eight prob-
lems. One has to be slightly areful sine there is a tehnial hith here. We annot for
example simply laim that online-E-Bribery[k℄ is a subase of online-E-$Bribery[k℄. If we
had implemented the unpried ase by still inluding pries in the input but requiring them
all to be 1, then it would be a subase. But regarding both pries (weights), our deni-
tions simply omit them ompletely from problems that are not about pries (weights). In
spirit, it is a subase, but formally it is not. Nonetheless, we an still reet the relation-
ship between these problems, namely, by stating how they are related via polynomial-time
many-one redutions. (We ould even make laims regarding more restritive redution
types, but sine this paper is onerned with omplexity lasses that are losed downwards
under polynomial-time many-one redutions, there is no reason to do so.) The following
proposition (and the onnetions that follow from it by the transitivity of polynomial-time
many-one redutions) aptures this.
Proposition 3.3. 1. For eah k > 0 and for eah eletion system E,
(a) online-E-Bribery[k℄ 
p
m
online-E-$Bribery[k℄,
(b) online-E-Bribery[k℄ 
p
m
online-E-Weighted-Bribery[k℄,
() online-E-$Bribery[k℄ 
p
m
online-E-Weighted-$Bribery[k℄, and
(d) online-E-Weighted-Bribery[k℄ 
p
m
online-E-Weighted-$Bribery[k℄.
2. The above item also holds for the ase when all of its problems are hanged to
their destrutive versions.
3. The above two items also hold for the ase when all the \[k℄"s are removed (e.g.,
we have online-E-Bribery 
p
m
online-E-$Bribery).
One might ask why our model reveals the votes only as the voters vote, but makes the
voters' pries/weights known in advane. The answer is that in most natural situations
of weighted voting, the weights are no seret. For example, it is well known how many
votes eah state has at a politial nominating onvention. And though people generally
do not publiize how easily they an be bribed, in our model for the pried ases, we
are assuming that the briber is ating with knowledge of eah voter's prie, perhaps due
to familiarity with the voter. Similarly, we are taking the order that voters vote as being
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known in advane, as also is the ase in many entral situations, from roll-all votes by state
at politial nominating onventions to the briber|a CS department hairperson|meeting
with faulty members one at a time in his or her oÆe to soliit (and perhaps bribe) their
votes on some entral issue.
Pulling bak to the bigger piture, it is very important to stress that bribery an be
about bribing in the \natural" sense of the word: paying people to hange their votes. But
bribery more generally models the situation where for eah of a number of agents there
is a ost assoiated with hanging that agent's vote. The ost indeed ould be ash given
to bribe them. But it ould be the \shoe leather" ost of sending ampaign workers to
their doors to hange their minds so they atually sinerely believe in and thus vote in a
given way. Or it ould be that the ost is measuring the danger to the briber of orrupting
without the voter's knowledge the given vote as it passes through the briber's hands (and
the briber is operating within a limit of how muh total danger he or she is willing to risk).
That is, bribery provides a relatively broad framework for alloating a limited resoure
(framed as \ost") to hange the votes of some among a number of agents. In fat, the
original bribery paper of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra [FHH09℄ itself already
allowed both pries and weights, and also studied the ase where the ost of the bribe varied
based on \how far" from the original preferene of the voter the briber wanted to move
the vote via bribery; and thus that paper itself was quite exible in what its framework
enompassed. That paper orretly stressed that the \bribery" being modeled was not
neessarily an immoral or evil at. For example, the bribery ould simply be a transation
in some broader optimization seeking to nd the lowest ost to reah a ertain type of
outome. Papers sine the work of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra [FHH09℄
have proposed a wide range of new variants of the ost struture or the allowed bribery
moves (or even the vote types or vote ensembles), depending on the situation being studied
(as just a few examples, [EFS09, EF10, BBHH15, BFNT15, SFE17℄).
4 General Upper Bounds and Matching Lower Bounds
Even for eletion systems with simple winner problems, the best general upper bounds that
we an prove for our problems reet an extremely high level of omplexity.
One might wonder whether that merely is a weakness in our upper-bound proofs. How-
ever, in eah ase, we provide a mathing ompleteness result proving that these really are
the hardest problems in the lasses their upper bounds put them in.
However, in Setion 5, we will see that for many spei natural, important systems, the
omplexity is tremendously lower than the upper bounds, despite the fat that the present
setion shows that there exist systems that meet the upper bounds.
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4.1 The General Upper Bound, Without Limits on the Number of Bribes
This setion overs upper bounds for the ase when any bribe limit/bribery budget is passed
in through the input|not hardwired into the problem itself.
Theorem 4.1. 1. For eah eletion system E whose winner problem in the unweighted
ase is in polynomial time (or even in polynomial spae), eah of the problems
online-E-Bribery, online-E-Destrutive-Bribery, online-E-$Bribery, and online-E-
Destrutive-$Bribery is in PSPACE.
2. For eah eletion system E whose winner problem in the weighted ase
is in polynomial time (or even in polynomial spae), eah of the prob-
lems online-E-Weighted-Bribery, online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery, online-E-
Weighted-$Bribery, and online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery is in PSPACE.
Proof. Consider rst the ase in whih the winner problem is in polynomial time. For
that problem, eah of the eight problems an learly be solved by (what is known as) an
alternating polynomial-time Turing mahine. It follows from the same paper of Chandra,
Kozen, and Stokmeyer that dened alternating polynomial-time Turing mahines [CKS81℄
that eah is in PSPACE.
We will not go into detail during this proof about alternating Turing mahines, but
simply put, they are Turing mahines that an make both universal and existential moves,
and the fat that the problems eah an be solved by suh mahines follows immediately
from the problems' denitions.
One an see in various ways that the eight problems remain in PSPACE even if their
winner problem is merely assumed to be in PSPACE. Perhaps the simplest way to see
that is that it follows from the above ombined with the fat that PSPACE
PSPACE
=
PSPACE, in the model in whih orale queries are themselves polynomially length-bounded,
sine all eight of our problems when generalized to PSPACE winner problems fall in
PSPACE
PSPACE
. ❑
4.2 The General Upper Bound, With Limits on the Number of Bribes
Turning to the ase where in the problem the number of bribes has a xed bound of k, these
problems fall into the 
p
2k+1
level of the polynomial hierarhy. That is not immediately
obvious. After all, even when one an bribe at most k times, one still for eah of the urrent
and future voters seems to need to explore the one-bit-per-voter deision of whether to
bribe the voters (plus in those ases where one does deide to bribe, one potentially has to
explore the exponential|in the number of andidates|possible votes to whih the voter
an be bribed). On its surfae, for our problems, that would seem to say that the number
of alternations between universal and existential moves that the natural polynomial-time
alternating Turing program for our problem would have to make is about the number of
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voters|a bound that would not leave the problem in any xed level of the polynomial
hierarhy, but would merely seem to put the problem in PSPACE.
So these problems are ases where even obtaining the stated upper bound is interesting
and requires a twist to prove. The twist is as follows. On the surfae the exploration of these
problems has an unbounded number of alternations between universal and existential states
in the natural, brute-fore alternating Turing mahine program. But for all but k of the
existential guesses on eah aepting path, the guess is a boring one, namely, we guess that
regarding that voter we don't bribe. We will show, by proving a more general result about
alternating Turing mahines and restritions on the struture of their maximal existential
move segments along aepting paths, a 
p
2k+1
upper bound on our sets of interest. In
some sense, in terms of being harged as to levels of the polynomial hierarhy, we will be
showing that if for a ertain olletion of 0-or-1 existential deisions one on eah aepting
path hooses 0 all but a xed number of times (although for the other times one may then
make many more nondeterministi hoies), one an manage to in eet not be harged at
all for the guessing ats that guessed 0.
We know of only one result in the literature that is anything like this. That result, whih
also ame up in the omplexity of online attaks on eletions, is a result of Hemaspaandra,
Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR17b℄, where in the ontext not of bribery but of voter
ontrol they showed that for eah xed k > 0 it holds that, for eah polynomial-time
alternating Turing mahine M whose alternation bloks are eah one bit long and that for
at most k of the existential bloks guess a zero, the language aepted by M is in oNP.
In ontrast, in the present paper's ase we are in a far more ompliated situation, sine
in bribery our existential bloks are burdened not just by 1-bit bribe-or-not deisions, but
for the ases when we deide to try bribing, we need to existentially guess what bribe to do.
And so we do not stay in oNP regardless of how large k is, as held in that earlier ase. But
we show that we an at least limit the growth to at most 2k+1 alternating quantiers|in
partiular, to the lass 
p
2k+1
. And sine we later provide problems of this sort that are
omplete for 
p
2k+1
, our 2k + 1 is optimal unless the polynomial hierarhy ollapses.
We will approah this in two steps. First, as Setion 4.2.1, we will prove the result
about alternating Turing mahines. And then, as Setion 4.2.2, we will apply that to online
bribery in the ase of only globally xed numbers of bribers being allowed.
4.2.1 A Result about Alternating Turing Machines
Briey put, an alternating Turing mahine [CKS81℄ (aka ATM) is a generalization of non-
deterministi and onondeterministi omputation. We will now briey review the basis
(see [CKS81℄ for a more omplete treatment). An ATM an make both universal and ex-
istential hoies. For a universal \node" of the mahine's ation to evaluate to true, all
its hild nodes (one eah for eah of its possible hoies) must evaluate to true. For an
existential \node" of the mahine's ation to evaluate to true, at least one of its hild nodes
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Figure 1: A weight 0 path in the tree of an ATM.
(it has one hild node for eah of its possible hoies) must evaluate to true. A leaf of the
omputation tree (a path, at its end) is said to evaluate to true if the path halted in an a-
epting state and is said to evaluate to false if the path halted in a nonaepting state. (As
our mahines are time-bounded, all paths halt.) Without loss of generality, in this paper
we assume that eah universal or existential node has either two hildren (namely, does a
universal or existential split over the hoies 0 and 1; we will often all this a \1-bit move")
or has exatly one hild (it does a trivial/degenerate universal or existential hoie of an
element from the one-element set f0g; we will often all this a \0-bit move"). The latter
ase is in eet a deterministi move, exept allowing degenerate 8 steps of that sort will
let us put a \separator" between otherwise ontiguous 9 omputation segments. Of ourse,
long existential guesses an be done in this model, for example by guessing a number of bits
sequentially. An ATM aepts or rejets based on what its root node evaluates to (whih
is determined indutively in the way desribed above).
Definition 4.2. Consider a path  in the tree of an ATM. The weight of that path is
as follows. Consider all maximal segments of existential nodes along the path. (As
mentioned above, we may without loss of generality, and do, assume that eah nonleaf
node is 9 or 8, although perhaps a degenerate suh node in the way mentioned above).
The weight of path  is its number of maximal existential segments suh that the
onatenation of the bits guessed in that segment is not the 1-bit string 0.
Let us illustrate this, as Figure 1. In the gure, the illustrated path (the leftmost one
at the left edge of the tree) has weight 0; it has three maximal existential segments, but
eah is of length one and makes the guess 0.
With this denition in hand, we an now state our key theorem showing that limited
weight for ATMs simplies the omplexity of the languages aepted. The result is one
where one may go bak and forth between thinking it is obvious and thinking it is not
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obvious. In partiular, note that even on aepting paths, whih must be of weight at
most k, it is ompletely possible that the number of alternations between existential and
universal nodes may be far greater than k and may be far greater than 2k + 1, and indeed
may grow unboundedly as the input's size inreases. What the theorem below is saying is
that despite that, mahines with bounded weight on their aepting paths still aept only

p
2k+1
sets.
Theorem 4.3. Let k  0 be xed. Eah polynomial-time ATM M suh that on no input
does M have an aepting path of weight stritly greater than k aepts a language in

p
2k+1
.
Proof. Let k  0 be xed. Let L be the language aepted by polynomial-time ATM M
that has the property that eah of its aepting paths has weight at most k. Our goal is to
prove that L 2 
p
2k+1
.
We will do so by proving that there is a set G 2 
p
2k+1
suh that L 
p
dtt
G, i.e.,
L polynomial-time disjuntively truth-table redues to G. By Fat 3.2, it follows that
L 2 
p
2k+1
.
Let q be a nondereasing polynomial that upper-bounds the running time of M . Let
h; i be a standard pairing funtion, i.e., a polynomial-time omputable, polynomial-time
invertible bijetion between 



and 

. Reall that every step of our ATM M involves
either a 0-bit existential move (whih we'll think of basially as existentially hoosing 0
from the hoie palette set f0g) or a 1-bit existential move (whih, reall, involves hoosing
one element from the hoie palette set f0; 1g with the mahine enforing an \or" over
the two hildren thus reahed) or a 0-bit universal move (whih we'll think of basially as
universally hoosing 0 from the hoie palette set f0g) or a 1-bit universal move. And the
1-bit moves involve suessor states hinged on whether the move-hoie is a 0 or a 1. (As
Turing mahines are standardly dened, there an be (one or multiple) suessor states to
a given state, hinged on a (degenerate or nondegenerate) hoie.)
G will be the set of all hx; si suh that all of the list of onditions that we will give below
hold relative to x and s. The intuition here is that s is a bit-vetor whose ith bit ontrols
how the ith maximal existential segment is handled. In partiular, if that ith bit is a 1,
then the segment moves forward unrestrained. But if that ith bit is a 0, then we expet
and require (and ut o that part of the tree otherwise) the maximal existential segment to
be a single existential step (either guessing a bit from f0; 1g or the allowed but superuous
existential step of guessing a bit from the one-element set f0g) and we basially will (as
desribed in part of step 3 below) ut that step out of the tree by replaing it by a trivially
universal step. Returning to our dening of G, the set G will be all hx; si suh that all the
following laims hold.
1. x 2 

and s 2 f0; 1g
q(jxj)
.
2. The number of \1"s in the bit-string s is at most k.
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3. M aepts when we simulate it on input x but with the following hanges in the
mahine's ation.
As one simulates M on a given path, onsider the rst existential node (if any) that
one enounters.
If the rst bit of s is a 1, then for that node we will diretly simulate it, and on all
paths that follow from this one, on all the following existential nodes (if any) that are
in an unbroken segment of existential nodes from this one, we will similarly diretly
simulate them. On the other hand, if the rst bit of s is a 0, then (a) if it is the
ase that if the urrent node makes the hoie 0 then the node that follows it is an
existential node, then the urrent path halts and rejets (beause something that s
is speifying as being a maximal existential segment onsisting of a single 0 learly
is not); and (b) if (a) does not hold (and so the node that follows if we make the
hoie 0 is either universal or a leaf), then do not take an existential ation at the
urrent node but rather implement it as a degenerate universal step (namely, a \8"
guess over one option, namely, 0, mathing as to next state and so on whatever the
existential node would have done on the hoie of 0).
If the path we are simulating didn't already end or get ut o during the above-
desribed handling of its rst, if any, maximal existential segment, then ontinue on
until we hit the start of its seond existential segment. We handle that exatly as
desribed above, exept now our ations are ontrolled not by the rst bit of s but
by the seond.
And similarly for the third maximal existential segment, the fourth, and so on.
All other aspets of this simulation are unhanged from M 's own native behavior.
Note that G 2 
p
2k+1
. Why? Even in the worst of ases for us, the omputation of
M starts with a 8 blok and then has k 9 bloks eah separated by a 8 blok; and then
we nish with a 8 blok. But then our ATM as it does that simulation starts with 8 and
has 2k alternations of quantier type, and thus has 2k+1 alternation bloks with 8 as the
leading one. And so by Chandra, Kozen, and Stokmeyer's [CKS81℄ haraterization of the
languages aepted by ATMs with that leading quantier and that number of alternations,
this set is in 
p
2k+1
.
Finally, we argue that L 
p
dtt
G. In partiular, note that L 
p
dtt
G via the redution that
on input x generates every length q(jxj) bit-string having less than or equal to k ourrenes
of the bit 1, and as its 
p
dtt
output list outputs eah of those paired with x. This list is
easily generated and is polynomial in size. In partiular, the number of pairs in the list is
learly at most
P
0jk
 
q(jxj)
j


P
0jk
(q(jxj))
j
 (k + 1)(q(jxj))
k
. That ompletes the
proof. ❑
In the above, we foused on maximal existential guess sequenes, and limiting the
number of those, on aepting paths, whose bit-sequene-guessed was other than the string
17
0. So we barred from aepting paths any maximal existential guess sequenes that ontain
a 1 and any that have two or more bits. We mention in passing that we ould have framed
things more generally in various ways. For example, we ould have made eah maximal
existential guess be of a xed polynomial length and ould have dened our notion of a
\boring" guess sequene not as the string \0" but as a string of 0's of exatly that length.
The 
p
2k+1
upper bound holds also in that setting, via only slight modiations to the proof.
4.2.2 The Upper-Bound Results Obtained by Applying the Previous Section’s Result about Alter-
nating Turing Machines
Theorem 4.4. 1. For eah k 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : g, and for eah eletion system E whose
winner problem in the unweighted ase is in polynomial time,
5
eah of the prob-
lems online-E-Bribery[k℄, online-E-Destrutive-Bribery[k℄, online-E-$Bribery[k℄,
and online-E-Destrutive-$Bribery[k℄ is in 
p
2k+1
.
2. For eah k 2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g, and for eah eletion system E whose winner prob-
lem in the weighted ase is in polynomial time,
6
eah of the problems online-E-
Weighted-Bribery[k℄, online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery[k℄, online-E-Weighted-
$Bribery[k℄, and online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery[k℄ is in 
p
2k+1
.
Proof. Let k > 0 be xed. Let us start by arguing that online-E-Weighted-$Bribery[k℄ 2

p
2k+1
.
As noted (for the ase without the bound of k) in Setion 3.2, what is really going
on here is about alternating quantiers. Consider a given input to the problem online-E-
Weighted-$Bribery[k℄. Let the voter under onsideration (i.e., u) in the fous moment of
that problem just for this paragraph be referred to as u
1
, and let the ones oming after it be
alled, in the order they our, u
2
, u
3
, : : : , u
`
. What the membership problem is in essene
asking is whether there exists an allowable (within both the prie budget and the global
limit of k allowed bribes) hoie as to whether to bribe u
1
(and if the deision is to bribe,
then whether there exists a vote to whih to bribe u
1
) suh that, for eah vote that u
2
may then be revealed to have, there exists an allowable (within both the prie budget and
the global limit of k allowed bribes) hoie as to whether to bribe u
2
(and if the deision is
to bribe, then whether there exists a vote to whih to bribe u
2
) suh that, for eah vote
that u
3
may then be revealed to have, : : : , suh that there exists an allowable (within both
the prie budget and the global limit of k allowed bribes) hoie as to whether to bribe
5
Unlike Theorem 4.1, we annot allow the winner problem here to be in PSPACE and argue that the rest
of the theorem holds unhanged. However, we an allow the winner problem here to even be in NP\ oNP,
and then the rest of the theorem holds unhanged. The key point to notie to see that that holds is|
as follows immediately from the fat that NP
NP\oNP
= NP [Sh83℄|that for eah k  0, NP \ oNP is

p
2k+1
-low, i.e., that
 

p
2k+1

NP\oNP
= 
p
2k+1
.
6
As in the ase of Footnote 5, the rest of the theorem remains unhanged even if we relax the \polynomial
time" to instead be \NP \ oNP."
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u`
(and if the deision is to bribe, then whether there exists a vote to whih to bribe u
`
)
suh that W
E
(C;U
0
)\ f j  

dg 6= ; (reall that that inequality says that the winner set
inludes some andidate that the briber likes at least as muh as the briber likes d; U
0
is
here representing the vote set after all the voting/bribing, as per Setion 3.2's denitions).
Note that for at most k of the hoie bloks assoiated with u
1
; u
2
; : : : an we make
the hoie to bribe. (In fat, if we have already done bribing of one or more voters in
V
<u
, then our remaining number of allowed bribes will be less than k.) Keeping that in
mind, imagine implementing the above paragraph's alternating-quantier-based algorithm
on a polynomial-time ATM. In our model, every step is either a universal or an existential
one, and let us program up all deterministi omputations that are part of the above via
degenerate universal steps. (We do that rather than using degenerate existential steps sine
those degenerate existential steps would interat fatally with our denition of maximal
existential sequene; we really need those plaes where one guesses that one will not bribe
to be aptured as a maximal existential sequene of length one with guess bit 0; this
omment is quietly using the fat that when making a 1-bit hoie as to whether to bribe
we assoiate the hoie 1 with \yes bribe this voter" and 0 with \do not bribe this voter.")
In light of that and the fat that we know that the weighted winner problem of eletion
system E is in P, the limit of k ensures that no aepting path will have weight greater
than k. And so by Theorem 4.3, we have that online-E-Weighted-$Bribery[k℄ 2 
p
2k+1
.
By the exat same argument, exept hanging the test at the end to W
E
(C;U
0
) \ f j
d 

g = ;, we have that online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery[k℄ 2 
p
2k+1
.
From these two results, it follows by Proposition 3.3 that online-E-Weighted-
Bribery[k℄ 2 
p
2k+1
and online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery[k℄ 2 
p
2k+1
.
That ompletes the proof of part 2 of the theorem. Now, we annot simply invoke
Proposition 3.3 to laim that part 1 holds. The reason is that part 1's hypothesis about the
winner problem merely puts the unweighted winner problem in P, but the proof we just
gave of part 2 used the fat that for that part we ould assume that the weighted winner
problem is in P.
However, the entire onstrution of this proof works perfetly well in the unweighted
ase, namely, we are only given that the unweighted winner problem is in P, but the
four problems we are studying are the four unweighted problems of part 1 of the theorem
statement. So we have that eah of the problems online-E-Bribery[k℄, online-E-Destrutive-
Bribery[k℄, online-E-$Bribery[k℄, and online-E-Destrutive-$Bribery[k℄ is in 
p
2k+1
. That
ompletes the proof of the theorem. ❑
4.3 Matching Lower Bounds
For eah of the PSPACE and 
p
2k+1
upper bounds established so far in this setion, we an
in fat establish a mathing lower bound. We show that by, for eah, proving that there is
an eletion system, with a polynomial-time winner problem, suh that the given problem is
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polynomial-time many-one hard for the relevant lass (and so, in light of the upper-bound
results, is polynomial-time many-one omplete for the relevant lass).
Theorem 4.5. 1. For eah problem I from this list of problems: online-E-Bribery,
online-E-Destrutive-Bribery, online-E-$Bribery, online-E-Destrutive-$Bribery,
online-E-Weighted-Bribery, online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery, online-E-
Weighted-$Bribery, and online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery, there exists
an (unweighted) eletion system E, whose winner problem in both the un-
weighted ase and the weighted ase is in polynomial time, suh that I is
PSPACE-omplete.
2. For eah k 2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g, and for eah problem I from this list of problems:
online-E-Bribery[k℄, online-E-Destrutive-Bribery[k℄, online-E-$Bribery[k℄, online-
E-Destrutive-$Bribery[k℄, online-E-Weighted-Bribery[k℄, online-E-Destrutive-
Weighted-Bribery[k℄, online-E-Weighted-$Bribery[k℄, and online-E-Destrutive-
Weighted-$Bribery[k℄, there exists an (unweighted) eletion system E, whose
winner problem in both the unweighted ase and the weighted ase is in
polynomial time, suh that I is 
p
2k+1
-omplete.
Proof. All sixteen upper bounds follow from Theorems 4.1 or 4.4. So we need only prove
the mathing lower bound in eah ase.
Let us rst address part of part 2 of the theorem. By Proposition 3.3, if we show
that there are eletion systems E and E
0
whose winner problems in both the unweighted
and weighted ases are in polynomial time, suh that online-E-Bribery[k℄ and online-E
0
-
Destrutive-Bribery[k℄ are both 
p
2k+1
-hard, then the 
p
2k+1
-hardness of the other six prob-
lems of part 2 of the theorem follow.
7
So let us fous on those two problems. And in partiular, let us fous now on the problem
online-E-Bribery[k℄. We will show that there is an eletion system E , whose unweighted and
weighted winner problems are in polynomial time, for whih this problem is 
p
2k+1
-hard.
7
For (no pun intended) ompleteness, we mention that for a some of the weakest among the 16 laims
here, although we will prove them by noting that they follow from more hallenging things that we will need
to prove here (beause those more hallenging things do not follow from [HHR14℄), we ould alternatively
establish them via results proved or stated in Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe's [HHR14℄ work on
online manipulation, in light of the fat that one an simulate online manipulation by pried online bribery
(via setting the budget to 1, the prie of the manipulators eah to 0, and the prie of the nonmanipulators
eah to 2). That paper handles weights dierently than this paper, and it doesn't provide lower-bound
mathing results for any of the general-ase destrutive settings. However, one from what that paper does
do one an, using the gateway we just mentioned, laim (from that paper's stated-without-proof result
regarding the \freeform online manipulation problem" [HHR14, p. 702℄) the 
p
2k+1
-hardness of online-E-
$Bribery[k℄ for some E whose unweighted winner problem is in polynomial time, and also one an laim
(regarding the other part of our theorem) the PSPACE-hardness of online-E-$Bribery for some E whose
unweighted winner problem is in polynomial time. However, both these laims will follow for free from the
more hallenging ases of lower bounds for unpried online bribery problems, whih we will in this proof
need to establish.
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To do this, we will insofar as possible be inspired by the online manipulation paper just
mentioned [HHR14℄, and will insofar as possible adopt its notations and phrasings. This
will help the novel hallenge here to better stand out. That novel hallenge is the one
mentioned in list item 2 on page 3. In the manipulation ase, we an by shaping the output
of the redution (from a 
p
2k+1
-omplete set) ontrol whih voters are manipulators, and
so an math and ontrol the quantier struture of the quantied boolean formula whose
truth we are trying to determine via an online manipulation question. However, in online
bribery, the briber an bribe any voters the briber wants (within the other onstraints).
This gives the briber quite a lot of freedom|enough to in eet shue whih quantiers
are whih in the boolean formula we are trying to in eet simulate; but that would ause
haos and would break our simulation's onnetion to the formula.
We will handle this by doing our simulation in eet on a transformed version of the
formula that is immune to quantier shuing, thanks to the transformed formula being
rigged so that any assignment as to whih quantiers are hosen to be 9 and whih are
hosen to be 8 annot possibly lead to a suessful bribe unless the assignment is preisely
the one that auses the online bribery to in eet orretly model and study the underlying
formula we are about as to where the quantiers are. (Put somewhat dierently, we reate
an online bribery problem where we in eet are foring the hand of the briber as to whom
to bribe.)
We will show that this an be done quite diretly, due to the power of boolean formulas.
Let us rst show how to do this, and then we will use this in our proof.
Consider any quantied boolean formula, i.e., (Q
1
 !
x
1
)(Q
2
 !
x
2
)    (Q
`
 !
x
`
)[F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
 !
x
`
)℄, where eah Q
i
is either an 9 or a 8, eah
 !
x
i
is shorthand for a list of boolean variables
(with no boolean variable appearing in more than one of the
 !
x
i
's), and F is a propositional
boolean formula. Let j be the number of Q
i
that are 9. Now, suppose we want to put that
formula into a setting where that same interior formula F is used, but the ` quantiers an
be reassigned in every possible way that has at most j of them being 9; and then we do an
\OR" over all the thus-generated quantied boolean formulas. For example, if our original
formula is
(8
 !
x
1
)(9
 !
x
2
)(8
 !
x
3
)[F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
;
 !
x
3
)℄;
then what we will in fat be assessing in that setting is this statement:
(9
 !
x
1
)(8
 !
x
2
)(8
 !
x
3
)[F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
;
 !
x
3
)℄ _
(8
 !
x
1
)(9
 !
x
2
)(8
 !
x
3
)[F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
;
 !
x
3
)℄ _
(8
 !
x
1
)(8
 !
x
2
)(9
 !
x
3
)[F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
;
 !
x
3
)℄ _
(8
 !
x
1
)(8
 !
x
2
)(8
 !
x
3
)[F (
 !
x
1
:
 !
x
2
;
 !
x
3
)℄:
(Sine 8 is never less demanding than 9, the nal disjunt above doesn't aet the formula's
truth value, and more generally, we ould just always onsider just the quantier assign-
21
ments that have exatly j 9 quantiers, rather than those that have j or fewer 9 quantiers.
But there is no need to use that, so we will just ignore it.)
Notie that our giant disjuntive formula may very well not be satised on the same set
of inputs as the original one, namely, it may be satised on additional inputs. What we'll
need in our proof is to make an easily-omputed ousin of the original formula that some-
how is \preinsulated" from having its truth value hanged by the above type of quantier
(re)assignment, yet that evaluates to true if and only if the original formula does. Let us
give that ousin. If the original formula is (as above)
(Q
1
 !
x
1
)(Q
2
 !
x
2
)    (Q
`
 !
x
`
)[F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
 !
x
`
)℄;
then our preinsulated ousin for it is
(Q
1
 !
x
1
; b
1
)(Q
2
 !
x
2
; b
2
)    (Q
`
 !
x
`
; b
`
)
h
F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
 !
x
`
)

^

^
fi jQ
i
=9g
b
i
i
:
Note that this ousin's propositional statement

F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
 !
x
`
)

^

V
fi jQ
i
=9g
b
i

an
never evaluate to true unless eah Q
i
that is an 9 in the original formula is an 9 here. Of
ourse, that is true in this naked version of the ousin, sine the quantiers are the same
and have not been shued yet. However, the key point is that if we take this ousin, and
as above take the disjuntion of every possible assignment of its quantiers that assigns at
most j of them to be 9, then that new quantied boolean formula evaluates to true if and
only if the original formula does. Further, the transformation from the original formula to
the ousin (and here we really mean the ousin, not the larger disjuntive item) is learly
a polynomial-time transformation and does not hange the quantiers, and so in partiular
if the original quantiers have eah Q
i
being 8 when i is odd and 9 when i is even, then so
will the ousin formula (and of ourse the ` and the F of the ousin formula are the same
as those of the original formula).
Basially, we've make a propositional formula that nails down its existential quantiers
as to how the formula an possibly be made true, even if it has to weather a disjuntion over
all possible shuings of its quantiers (even if that shuing is allowed to|pointlessly|
derease the number of 9 quantiers).
Fix any k  0. With the above \(preinsulated) ousin" work in hand, we an now give
our proof that there exists an eletion system E , whose unweighted and weighted winner
problems are in polynomial time, suh that online-E-Bribery[k℄ is 
p
2k+1
-hard. We will do
so by giving suh an eletion system E (whih depends on k) and giving a polynomial-time
many-one redution to online-E-Bribery[k℄ from the 
p
2k+1
-omplete problem we will denote
A
2k+1
, where A
2k+1
is all formulas of the form
(8
 !
x
1
)(9
 !
x
2
)(8
 !
x
3
)(9
 !
x
4
)    (8
   !
x
2k+1
)[F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
   !
x
2k+1
)℄
that evaluate to true (here, F is required to be a propositional boolean formula and as
above, the
 !
x
i
's are pairwise disjoint variable olletions) and suh that (this additional
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nonstandard requirement learly an be made without loss of generality, in the sense that
even with this the set we are dening is learly 
p
2k+1
-omplete) at least one variable from
within eah of the
 !
x
i
's expliitly ours in the formula F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
   !
x
2k+1
).
Let us give the eletion system E and the polynomial-time many-one redution from
A
2k+1
to online-E-Bribery[k℄. As mentioned before, we will stay as lose as possible to the
argument line used in the hardness arguments for online manipulation.
Let us rst speify our (unweighted) eletion system E . If the input to E is (C; V ),
the eletion system will do the following. The system will rst look at the andidate set
and determine whih andidate, let us all it , has the lexiographially smallest among
the andidate names in C. Next, E will look at the bit-string  to determine whether it
is (i.e., whether it enodes) a tiered boolean formula. A tiered boolean formula [HHR14℄
is a formula whose variable names are eah of the form x
i;m
(whih really means a diret
enoding of a string, suh as \x
14;92
"); the i;m elds must be positive integers. If  annot
be validly parsed in this way, then we delare no andidates to be the winner of the eletion.
But otherwise, we have in hand a tiered formula represented by . For a given i, we will
think of all the variables x
i;m
that our in  as being a \blok" of variables (as they will all
be falling under a partiular quantier). Let SubsriptOneMax denote the maximum value
that ours in the rst omponent of any of our x
i;m
variables that our in  (tehnially,
in the formula enoded by , but we will heneforward just refer to that as ); this will tell
us the number of bloks. Let SubsriptTwoMax denote the maximum value that ours in
the seond omponent of any of our x
i;m
variables that our in . Now, E will immediately
delare that everyone loses unless all of the following things hold:
1. The number of voter names in V is at least SubsriptOneMax+1. (That is, eah vote
onsists of a name and an order. It is possible that the same name appears multiples
times, perhaps some times with the same order|as happens when an unweighted
winner problem is reated from a weighted eletion that has at least one weight that
is 2 or more|and perhaps sometimes with dierent orders. But what this ondition
is saying is that if one onsiders the set of all names that our in at least one of the
votes in V , that set of names is of ardinality at least SubsriptOneMax .)
2. SubsriptOneMax = 2k + 1.
3. The number of andidates in C is greater than or equal to 1+ 2 SubsriptTwoMax .
(This ondition is to ensure that eah vote's preferene order is about a large enough
number of andidates that it an be used to assign all the variables in one quantier
blok.)
4. No blok is unpopulated; that is, for eah b, 1  b  SubsriptOneMax ,  ontains
at least one variable x
i;m
whose rst omponent is b.
Now, E will make a list, whih we will refer to as the \speial list," of SubsriptOneMax
votes from V . E will make the list in the following somewhat involved fashion. Let Names
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be the set of all voter names that our in V , i.e., it is the set of all names suh that that name
is the rst omponent of at least one vote in V . Reall that if we have reahed this point,
we know that kNamesk  SubsriptOneMax +1. For eah i, 1  i  SubsriptOneMax ,
the ith vote in our speial list will be, among all votes whose rst omponent is lexiograph-
ially the (i + 1)st smallest string in Names , the vote with the lexiographially smallest
seond omponent. This list will not inlude any vote whose rst omponent is the lex-
iographially smallest string in Names. (This feature will be used later in the proof to
keep the pathologial voter u from breaking the proof.) Note also that, for example, even if
\Alie" appears many times as the rst-omponent eld of elements in the list V , at most
one Alie vote will appear in our speial list of SubsriptOneMax votes.
Now (reall, we are still dening the eletion system E 's ation; we are not here speaking
of our online bribery problem), E will use the vote of the rst voter in this speial list
to assign truth values to all variables x
1;
, will use the vote of the seond voter in this
speial list to assign truth values to all variables x
2;
, and so on up to the vote of the
SubsriptOneMax th voter, whih will assign truth values to all variables x
SubsriptOneMax ;
.
Let us now set out how votes reate those assignments. For this, we will use the oding
sheme from [HHR14℄, whih is as follows. Consider a vote whose total order over C is 
0
(reall that we have that kCk  1 + 2  SubsriptTwoMax ). Remove  from the order 
0
,
yielding 
00
. Let 
1
<

00

2
<

00
   <

00

2SubsriptTwoMax
be the 2  SubsriptTwoMax least
preferred andidates in 
00
. Then E will build a vetor in f0; 1g
SubsriptTwoMax
as follows:
The dth bit of the vetor is 0 if the string that names andidate 
2d 1
(e.g., \Eilonwy") is
lexiographially less than the string that names andidate 
2d
(e.g., \Rowella"), and this
bit is 1 otherwise. Let
 !
b
i
denote the vetor thus built from the ith vote (in the above
speial list), 1  i  SubsriptOneMax . For eah variable x
i;m
ourring in , assign
to that variable the value of the mth bit of
 !
b
i
, where 0 represents false and 1 represents
true. This proess has assigned all the variables of , so  evaluates to either true or false.
If  evaluates to true, everyone wins under system E , and otherwise everyone loses under
system E . This ompletes our denite of eletion system E . Note that the eletion system E
that we just dened has a polynomial-time winner problem in both the unweighted and the
weighted ases. This is beause our speial list was simply onstruted and eah boolean
formula, given an assignment for all its variables, an easily be evaluated in polynomial
time.
With our E in hand, let us now show that online-E-Bribery[k℄ is 
p
2k+1
-hard, via giv-
ing a polynomial-time many-one redution to online-E-Bribery[k℄ from the 
p
2k+1
-omplete
problem A
2k+1
that was dened above.
Here is how the redution works. Let y be an instane of A
2k+1
, i.e., y is of the form:
(8
 !
x
1
)(9
 !
x
2
)(8
 !
x
3
)(9
 !
x
4
)    (8
   !
x
2k+1
)[F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
   !
x
2k+1
)℄
and at least one variable from within eah of the
 !
x
i
's expliitly ours in F . The above
formula may evaluate to true or may evaluate to false; that is the question we want answered.
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(We here are ignoring syntatially illegal inputs, as they obviously are not in A
2k+1
and
so an be easily handled.) Let us transform y into its ousin formula, as per the above
disussion, i.e., we transform y into the following formula y
0
:
(8
 !
x
1
; b
1
)(9
 !
x
2
; b
2
)(8
 !
x
3
; b
3
)(9
 !
x
4
; b
4
)    (8
   !
x
2k+1
; b
2k+1
)
h
F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
   !
x
2k+1
)

^

b
2
^ b
4
^    ^ b
2k
i
:
(For the k = 0 ase, simply skip the seond onjunt. The odd b
i
are superuous, but do
no harm.) Note that we an view the above y
0
as being the formula (here  will be the
entire above propositional part):
(8x
1;1
; x
1;2
; : : : ; x
1;k
1
) (9x
2;1
; x
2;2
; : : : ; x
2;k
2
)    (8
2k+1
x
2k+1;1
; x
2k+1;2
; : : : ; x
2k+1;k
2k+1
)
[(x
1;1
; x
1;2
; : : : ; x
1;k
1
; x
2;1
; x
2;2
; : : : ; x
2;k
2
; : : : ; x
2k
1
;1
; x
2k+1;2
; : : : ; x
2k+1;k
2k+1
)℄;
where the quantier applied to the x
i;
variables is 8 if i is odd and is 9 if i is even, the x
i;j
are boolean variables,  is the abovementioned propositional boolean formula, and note
that for eah i, 1  i  2k + 1,  will ontain at least one variable of the form x
i;
.
Let us, with y
0
in hand, and viewed in terms of the just-given variable names and for-
mula , ontinue with speifying the redution, keeping in mind that this is a preinsulated
formula.
Our many-one redution will map to the instane (C; V; ; d;B) of online-E-Bribery[k℄,
speied by the following:
1. C ontains a andidate whose name, , enodes , and in addition C ontains
2  max(k
1
; : : : ; k
2k+1
) other andidates, all with names lexiographially greater
than |for speiity, let us say their names are the 2  max(k
1
; : : : ; k
2k+1
) strings
that immediately follow  in lexiographi order.
2. V ontains 2k + 2 voters, 0; 1; 2; : : : ; 2k + 1, who vote in that order, where u = 0 is
the distinguished voter (so there are no voters in V
<u
and there are 2k + 1 voters
in V
>u
). The voter names will be lexiographially ordered by their number, so 0 is
least and 2k+1 is greatest. u's preferene order  will atually be irrelevant, beause
sine u will have the lexiographially smallest name among all voters, u's vote will
be ignored by our eletion system E ; but for speiity, let us say u's preferene order
is to simply rank the andidates in lexiographi order.
3. The briber's preferene order  is to like andidates in the opposite of their lexio-
graphi order. In partiular,  is the briber's most preferred andidate. And we set
d to be  (so the goal of the online bribery problem beomes simply to make  be a
winner).
4. B, the limit on the number of allowed bribes, is k.
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Note that this is a polynomial-time redution. And it follows from this redution's on-
strution and the denition of E that y
0
is in A
2k+1
if and only if the thus-onstruted
(C; V ; d;B) is in online-E-Bribery[k℄.
Why? The online bribery problem will be asking whether there is some way of bribing at
most k of the voters so as to make  be a winner. Sine this is an online bribery problem, we
thus are existentially quantifying for eah of those k voters as to his or her ast preferene
order, and for all the other voters we are universally quantifying as to their preferene
orders. The preferene order of the voter named i (who will on this input be the (i+ 1)st
voter on our \speial list" dened earlier) will be ontrolling the setting of the variables in
the ith blok of .
Now, all possible hoies of where to bribe are allowed, as long as the total number of
bribes is at most B (i.e., at most k). However, the eletion system is routing these assigned
variables to our preinsulated formula , and so by the properties of our preinsulated formula,
the only possible ase that an result in the formula being true (and thus all andidates|
and so in partiular andidate |winning, as opposed to all andidates losing) is when every
even-numbered voter other than voter 0 is bribed. But as there are only k allowed bribes
and there are k even-numbered voters other than 0 (namely, the voters named 2; 4; : : : ; 2k),
those bribes already use every allowed bribe, and so we know that the only way  an
be a winner is if every odd-numbered voter and voter 0 remain unbribed and every even-
numbered voter other than 0 is bribed. And so our online-bribery problem is in fat testing
whether y 2 A
2k+1
; d is a winner (in fat, all andidates are winners) in the onstruted
instane (C; V ; d;B) if and only if y 2 A
2k+1
.
We thus have shown that online-E-Bribery[k℄ is 
p
2k+1
-hard, and thus in light of the
earlier upper bound, have shown that online-E-Bribery[k℄ is 
p
2k+1
-omplete.
It follows immediately from Proposition 3.3 that online-E-$Bribery[k℄ is 
p
2k+1
-hard,
and thus in light of the earlier upper bound is 
p
2k+1
-omplete.
As to online-E-Weighted-Bribery[k℄, if we use the entire above onstrution and assign
to eah voter weight 1, we have (keeping in mind that for E both the unweighted and the
weighted winner problems are in polynomial time), the thus-altered onstrution shows that
online-E-Weighted-Bribery[k℄ is 
p
2k+1
-hard, and thus in light of the earlier upper bound
is 
p
2k+1
-omplete. And from that, the earlier upper bound, and Proposition 3.3, we have
that online-E-Weighted-$Bribery[k℄ is 
p
2k+1
-omplete.
That overs the four onstrutive (i.e., not destrutive) ases of part 2 of the theorem.
But the same onstrution, easily modied for the ase of unbounded numbers of quan-
tiers, analogously yields PSPACE-hardness results, and thus by the earlier upper bounds
PSPACE-ompleteness results, for the four onstrutive ases from part 1 of the theorem.
In partiular, to show that online-E-Bribery is PSPACE-hard, and thus in light of the ear-
lier upper bound PSPACE-omplete, we now map to online-E-Bribery from the PSPACE-
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omplete set A
QBF
, dened here as all formulas of the form
(8
1
 !
x
1
)(9
2
 !
x
2
)(8
3
 !
x
3
)(9
 !
x
4
)    (8
z
 !
x
z
)[F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
 !
x
z
)℄
that evaluate to true (here, F is required to be a propositional boolean formula, and the
 !
x
i
's are required to be pairwise disjoint variable olletions, and z is an odd integer) and
suh that at least one variable from within eah of the
 !
x
i
's expliitly ours in the formula
F (
 !
x
1
;
 !
x
2
; : : : ;
 !
x
z
). Speifying that the leading quantier is a 8 and that the number of
quantiers in our alternating quantier sequene is odd and that at least one variable from
eah blok expliitly ours in F is not the standard version of QBF, but learly also yields
a PSPACE-omplete set. And having it be of this form makes it lear how to speify E
(namely, for inputs whose SubsriptOneMax value is 2k + 1, we use the version of the
above E that assumes and enfores that SubsriptOneMax = 2k + 1) and what redution
to use (namely, given a formula with the syntax and properties (exept perhaps truth) of
A
QBF
, having 2k + 1 alternating quantiers, we use the ations of the redution for the

p
2k+1
ase above). (The redution's ations are suÆiently uniform and simple that what
was just mentioned an itself be done in a single polynomial-time many-one redution that
handles all odd sequene lengths of alternating quantiers whose rst quantier is a 8.)
So we have handled all eight onstrutive ases. The eight destrutive ases are analo-
gous. We won't do this in detail, but basially as to E one does everything as above, exept
every plae that in the denition of an eletion system E we said everyone wins one hanges
that to saying that everyone loses, and everywhere we above in the denition of an eletion
system E said everyone loses one hanges that to saying that everyone wins. And as to the
redutions, one uses the same redutions as above.
This ompletes the proof of the theorem. ❑
We now will show that the onstrutions in the proof of the above theorem an be
extended to make the eletions systems involved all be simultaneously (andidate-)neutral
and (voter-)anonymous (the onstrutions in the proof above are neither).
So, let us speak about the properties of the eletion systems used in the proof of
Theorem 4.5. Clearly, the eletion systems used are quite artiial. That is not surprising;
we are trying to reate systems whose winner problems apture tremendously high levels
of omplexity. Nonetheless, the eletion systems we used in the proof are in some ways
pushing to the limits of what eletion systems are allowed to do. They are using, asym-
metrially, the names of the andidates; and they are using, asymmetrially, the names of
the voters.
One might worry that these evil properties are essential to the high levels of omplexity
we prove, i.e., that eletion systems that have suh nie properties as (andidate-)neutrality
(i.e., permuting the names of the andidates leaves the winner set unhanged exept for
the ation of the permutation [Gui52, Arr63℄) and (voter-)anonymity (i.e., any permutation
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among the elements of the set all names that appear as voter names in the input leaves the
winner set unhanged).
However, we will now very briey mention how one an alter our proofs|while not
hanging the lower bounds we obtain|so as to allow the proofs to use eletion systems E
that have any or indeed all of these nie properties. For eah of these three ases, we will
sketh only the hange in the eletion system. From that, the adjustment of the hardness
redutions is impliit and lear in eah ase.
For eah ase, let us fous just on our spotlight problem from the proof, namely, online-
E-Bribery[k℄. The others an eah be varied analogously.
Let us onsider rst how to hange our approah so that our eletion system is voter-
anonymous. Keep in mind that when speaking of permuting the names that our, we
always mean that, e.g., if two voters are named \Alie," their names ould be hanged to
some other name that appears in the input, but their names would have to hange to the
same new name; it is a permutation over the ourring set of names. Note that the only way
the proof is using voter names is to use the lexiographi ordering of the voter names. Let
us show how to replae that use. Given a set of votes, let us extrat the set of names that
are the name of at least one voter. Now sort them in lexiographi order. Now, for eah
vote whose voter-name is the lexiographially ith in that set of names (i = 1; 2; 3; : : : ),
replae that vote with i idential opies of that vote. Now, what our new E will do is it
will look at the set of votes, and will see if that set is suh there is exatly one voter name
that appears in exatly one vote, there are exatly two voter names that appear in exatly
two idential votes and those votes are idential, there are exatly three voter names that
appear in exatly three idential votes and those votes are idential, and so on, up to some
k where this is satised, and we have overed all the votes. Of ourse, many inputs won't
satisfy this, and for those, we know that we are not in the image of our redution, and so
what we do isn't partiularly important (e.g., we an take some simple ation suh as to
have all andidates win). But the redutions used in the proof had the property that eah
voter appears exatly one (and even in the impliit redutions in the weighted ase, that
is true and all weights are one). So E an in fat detet from those multipliities what the
original order of the voter names was lexiographially, and it does so, and then ollapses
eah of the tuples of 1 or 2 or 3 or so on idential votes down to a single opy of that vote,
and then renames them to reet and have voter names with the deteted lexiographial
ordering, and then does what our original E would have done on the thus generated set of
votes. So, that is how we an make the eletion system voter-anonymous.
Now let us turn to how we an alter the proof of our online-E-Bribery[k℄ result to allow
the use of an eletion system E that is andidate-neutral. (We note in passing that we will
even ahieve a stronger ase, namely, what is alled andidate-anonymity [HHR09℄, whih
basially lets one not merely be blind to name permutations of the names in one's urrent
eletion, but even allows one to rename a andidate to a name outside of the set of names
that were part of the input.) Sine the andidates names are most ruially being used to
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pass in a formula , the natural way to ahieve andidate anonymity would be to add a
dummy voter that itself is in its name oding . However, that approah will make our
system non-voter-anonymous in a way that goes far beyond merely using the lexiographi
order of the voter names; and so the above method of ahieving voter-anonymity would not
work on this, and we would have trouble ahieving simultaneous andidate-neutrality and
voter-anonymity. So we will use a more elaborate approah. While doing that, we also will
need to address the fat that the proof's sheme for extrating assignments from votes was
itself entrally depending on the lexiographi ordering of the andidates' names; so that
too must be sidestepped. Briey, we do these things as follows. As to how to pass  in, we
piggy-bak on top of the voter multipliity approah used to ensure voter-anonymity. Say
the original list of voters had z votes, with eah name appearing in exatly one vote. So the
voter-anonymity transformation will hange that into a list of 1 + 2 +    + z votes, total,
whose name multipliities are 1, 2, . . . , z. But now we will add some more votes, in a way
we will now desribe. We will in doing so ensure that we have no names whose multipliity
is z + 1. We will use higher multipliities to ode the bits of the formula , as follows. We
will put in a vote, repeated z + 2 times, if the rst bit of  is 0 and we will put in a vote,
repeated z+3 times if the rst bit of  is 1. (What that vote's order is is irrelevant, and as
to that vote's name part, we will make it dier from all other names that are urrently in
the vote set.) Similarly, we will put in a vote, repeated z + 4 times, if the seond bit of 
is 0 and we will put in a vote, repeated z + 5 times if the seond bit of  is 1. (What that
vote's order is is irrelevant, and as to that vote's name part, we will make it dier from all
other names that are urrently in the vote set.) And so on until all the bits of  have been
oded, at whih point we will put in voters (again with virgin names) at both of the next
two multipliities. If  for example is two bits long, the fat that we have votes repeated
z + 6 and z + 7 times will let us detet that we have reahed the end of 's oding. (This
embedding sheme is basially reating a self-delimiting enoding|just one expressed as
bit-string that is impliitly give by the ourrene/nonourene of various multipliities
in our onstruted vote set.) The z + 7 idential votes will also be used in handling for
\deoding of votes into variable assignments" issue, in a moment. Of ourse, E will look at
all of this and will extrat  and then will use  in the same way it previously was used.
(The votes of low multipliity|up to z|are handled as per the voter-anonymity disussion
earlier. If the input does not have this multipliity struture, we know it is not generated
by our redution, and we do pretty muh anything, e.g., delare all andidates to be losers.)
All that remains is how to sidestep the fat that in deoding votes into variable assignments,
we used the lexiographi ordering of andidate names to group andidates into pairs in
a way that was important in speifying the variable assignment. However, that is easily
avoided, simply by hanging our deoding proess to instead of being \the dth bit of the
vetor is 0 if the string that names 
2d 1
is lexiographially less than the string that names

2d
, and this bit is 1 otherwise" will instead be \the dth bit of the vetor is 0 if andidate

2d 1
omes before andidate 
2d
in the one order of the one vote that is repeated z + 7
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times, and this bit is 1 otherwise." What we have done here is, to get around the fat that
we do not want to depend on having true aess to the lexiographi order of the andidate
names, we instead took one dummy voter to, via its preferene order, set an order that will
dene the ordering over the andidates that we use to turn votes into variable assignments.
It is important to keep in mind that that dummy voter annot possibly be bribed, as we
set up our online bribery problem so that we are ontrolling whih votes must be bribed
in order to have any hane of suess, and we do so in a way that leaves no headroom for
the dummy to be bribed. Also, what preferene order that dummy voter has does not itself
matter, sine it is just setting an ordering, and the universal quantiers will still be over
all possible assignments and the existential ones will still be allowed to grab any partiular
one.
Thus, we an make the eletion system simultaneously andidate-neutral and voter-
anonymous.
5 Online Bribery for Specific Systems
In this setion, we look at the omplexity of online bribery for various natural systems.
For both Plurality and Approval, we show that pried, weighted online bribery is NP-
omplete but that the eletion system's other three online bribery variants are in P. This
also shows that bribery an be harder than online bribery for natural systems. In addition,
we provide omplete dihotomy theorems that distinguish NP-hard from easy ases for all
our online bribery problems for soring rules and additionally we show that Veto eletions,
even with three andidates, have even higher lower bounds for weighted online bribery,
namely P
NP[1℄
-hardness.
The following theorem is useful for proving lower bounds for online bribery for spei
systems.
Theorem 5.1. 1. (\Regular") manipulation redues to orresponding online bribery.
(So, E-UCM redues to online-E-Bribery, E-DUCM redues to online-E-
Destrutive-Bribery, E-WCM redues to online-E-Weighted-Bribery, and E-DWCM
redues to online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery.)
2. Construtive manipulation in the unique winner model redues to orresponding
online destrutive bribery. (So, E-UCM in the unique winner model redues to
online-E-Destrutive-Bribery and E-WCM in the unique winner model redues to
online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery.)
3. Online manipulation redues to orresponding online pried bribery. (So,
online-E-UCM redues to online-E-$Bribery, online-E-DUCM redues to online-E-
Destrutive-$Bribery, online-E-WCM redues to online-E-Weighted-$Bribery, and
online-E-DWCM redues to online-E-Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery.)
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Proof. For the rst part, let V
<u
be the nonmanipulators and let fug [ V
>u
be the manip-
ulators. The vote of u is irrelevant. Let k be the sum of the weights of the manipulators
(meaning all voters in fug [ V
>u
an be bribed). In the onstrutive ase, the preferred
andidate p beomes the designated andidate, whih is ranked rst in . In the destrutive
ase, the despised andidate d beomes the designated andidate, whih is ranked last in .
For the seond part, let again be V
<u
the nonmanipulators and fug [ V
>u
the manip-
ulators. The vote of u is irrelevant. Let k be the sum of the weights of the manipulators
(meaning again that all voters in fug[V
>u
an be bribed). The ranking puts the preferred
andidate rst. The other andidates are ranked in arbitrary order, and the designated
andidate is the andidate ranked seond.
For the last part, set the prie of the manipulators to 0, the prie of the nonmanipulators
to 1, and set k to 0. ❑
It is interesting to note that, assuming P 6= NP, bribery does not redue to
orresponding online bribery, not even for natural systems. For example, Approval-
Bribery is NP-omplete [FHH09, Theorem 4.2℄, but we will show below in Theorem 5.7
that online-Approval-Bribery (and even online-Approval-Weighted-Bribery and online-
Approval-$Bribery) are in P.
We end this setion with a simple observation about unpried, unweighted online
bribery.
Observation 5.2. For unpried, unweighted online bribery, it is always optimal to bribe
the last k voters (we don't even have to handle u in a speial way). This implies
that unpried, unweighted online bribery is ertainly reduible to unweighted online
manipulation, and so we inherit those upper bounds.
5.1 Plurality
In this setion, we ompletely lassify the omplexity of all our versions of online bribery
for the most important natural system, Plurality. In this system, eah andidate sores
a point when it is ranked rst in a vote and the andidates with the most points are the
winners. We show that these problems are NP-omplete if we have both pries and weights,
and in P in all other ases.
The following observation is ruial in our upper bound proofs: For online-Plurality-
Weighted-$Bribery and online-Plurality-Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery, there is a suess-
ful bribery if and only if there is a suessful bribery where all bribed voters from u onward
vote for the same highest-soring desired andidate
8
and all nonbribed voters after u vote
8
In the onstrutive ase we all all members of f j  

dg|and in the destrutive ase we all all
members of f j  >

dg|desired andidates, where  is the briber's ideal ranking and d the designated
andidate.
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for the same highest-soring undesired andidate. If u is bribed, we do not ount u's original
vote to ompute the highest sore. If u is not bribed, then we ount u's vote.
Theorem 5.3. online-Plurality-Bribery, online-Plurality-Destrutive-Bribery, online-
Plurality-Weighted-Bribery, online-Plurality-Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery, online-
Plurality-$Bribery, and online-Plurality-Destrutive-$Bribery are in P.
Proof. First look at online-Plurality-Weighted-Bribery. We are given an OBS (C; V; ; d; k),
where V = (V
<u
; u; V
>u
). We an bribe suessfully if and only if we an bribe suessfully
and we bribe u or we an bribe suessfully and we do not bribe u. Let  
d
= f j  

dg
be the desired andidates and let k
0
be the number of voters in V
<u
that have already been
bribed. If k
0
> k, our instane is illegal and we rejet. If  
d
= C, we an suessfully bribe,
and we aept.
To hek whether we an bribe suessfully and bribe u, let  be a andidate in  
d
with
highest sore in V
<u
. If k
0
 k, we an't bribe u and we rejet. Otherwise, bribe u to vote
for  and bribe min(k  k
0
  1; kV
>u
k) highest-weight voters in V
>u
to vote for . This will
give us the sore of  after bribery. Now let h be a andidate in C    
d
with highest sore
in V
<u
. Assume that all the nonbribed voters in V
>u
vote for h. Then we an suessfully
bribe if and only if the sore of  is at least the sore of h.
To hek whether we an bribe suessfully and not bribe u, let  be a andidate in  
d
with highest sore in V
<u
[ fug. Bribe min(k   k
0
; kV
>u
k) highest-weight voters in V
>u
to
vote for . This will give us the sore of  after bribery. Now let h be a andidate in C  
d
with highest sore in V
<u
[ fug. Assume that all the nonbribed voters in V
>u
vote for h.
Then we an suessfully bribe if and only if the sore of  is at least the sore of h.
For the destrutive ase, we argue similarly, exept that we let  
d
= f j  >

dg and
we are suessful if the sore of  is greater than the sore of h.
Next look at online-Plurality-$Bribery. We are given an OBS (C; V; ; d; k), where
V = (V
<u
; u; V
>u
). We an bribe suessfully if and only if we an bribe suessfully and
we bribe u or we an bribe suessfully and we do not bribe u. Let  
d
= f j  

dg and
let k
0
be the prie of the voters in V
<u
that are bribed. If k
0
> k, our instane is illegal and
we rejet. If  
d
= C, we an suessfully bribe, and we aept.
To hek whether we an bribe suessfully and bribe u, let  be a andidate in  
d
with
highest sore in V
<u
. If k
0
+ (u) > k, we an't bribe u and we rejet. Otherwise, bribe
u to vote for  and bribe a lowest-pried voter in V
>u
to vote for , as long as the prie of
the bribed voters is at most k. This will give us the sore of  after bribery. Now let h be
a andidate in C    
d
with highest sore in V
<u
. Assume that all the nonbribed voters in
V
>u
vote for h. Then we an suessfully bribe if and only if the sore of  is at least the
sore of h.
To hek whether we an bribe suessfully and not bribe u, let  be a andidate in  
d
with highest sore in V
<u
[fug. Bribe a lowest-pried voter in V
>u
to vote for , as long as
the prie of the bribed voters is at most k. Bribe min(k  k
0
; kV
>u
k) highest-weight voters
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in V
>u
to vote for . This will give us the sore of  after bribery. Now let h be a andidate
in C    
d
with highest sore in V
<u
[ fug. Assume that all the nonbribed voters in V
>u
vote for h. Then we an suessfully bribe if and only if the sore of  is at least the sore
of h.
For the destrutive ase, we again argue similarly, exept that we let  
d
= f j  >

dg
and we are suessful if the sore of  is greater than the sore of h. ❑
Theorem 5.4. online-Plurality-Weighted-$Bribery and online-Plurality-Destrutive-
Weighted-$Bribery are NP-omplete, even when restrited to two andidates.
Proof. These problems are in NP, using the observation at the start of this setion: Guess a
set of voters to bribe, hek that their prie is within the budget, let all these bribed voters
vote for the same highest-soring desired andidate, and let all nonbribed voters vote for
the same highest-soring undesired andidate. Aept if a desired andidate wins in the
onstrutive ase and aept if no undesired andidate wins in the destrutive ase.
To show NP-hardness for the onstrutive ase, we use the same onstrution as for
\regular" bribery with pries and weights. We redue from (the standard NP-omplete
problem) Partition. Let s
1
; : : : ; s
n
be a sequene of nonnegative integers suh that
P
n
i=1
=
2S. We map to OBS (C; V; ; d; k), where C = fd; g, d >

, the prie and weight of the
ith voter are both s
i
, u is the rst voter and votes for , and k = S.
For the destrutive ase, our designated andidate will be , and V
<u
onsists of one
unbribed weight-1 voter who votes for d. ❑
5.2 Beyond Plurality
A soring rule for m andidates is a vetor  = (
1
; : : : ; 
m
) of integers 
1
 
2
    

m
 0. This denes an eletion system on m andidates where eah andidate earns 
i
points for eah vote that ranks it in the ith position and the andidates with the most
points are the winners.
Theorem 5.5. For eah soring vetor  = (
1
; : : : ; 
m
),
1. online--Weighted-$Bribery and online--Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery are in P
if 
1
= 
m
and NP-hard otherwise;
2. online--Weighted-Bribery and online--Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery are in P if

2
= 
m
and NP-hard otherwise; and
3. online--Bribery; online--Destrutive-Bribery; online--$Bribery, and online--
Destrutive-$Bribery are in P.
Proof. If 
1
= 
m
, all andidates are always winners. If 
1
> 
2
= 
m
, this is in
essene Plurality, whih is handled in the theorems above. In all other onstrutive ases,
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the hardness follows from the hardness for -Weighted-Manipulation from [HH07℄ and
Theorem 5.1. In all other destrutive ases, the hardness follows from the hardness for -
Weighted-Manipulation in the unique winner model from [HH07℄ and Theorem 5.1. (Note
that -Destrutive-Weighted-Manipulation is easily seen to be in P. Basially, to make
d not a winner, we need an a suh that a's sore is higher than d's sore. So, make all
manipulators vote a >    > d, and ompute the sores. So, this does not help us with the
lower bound for online--Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery.)
For the last ase, we rst look at the unpried, unweighted ase, even though the result
follows from the pried ase. We do this beause the algorithm for this ase is muh simpler.
Note that it follows from Observation 5.2 that we an assume that all bribed voters go last
and so we have k
0
nonbribed voters followed by k bribed voters. Sine there are only a
onstant number of dierent votes, simply brute-fore to determine whether it is the ase
that for all (polynomially many) possible k
0
votes, there are k votes suh that a andidate
that is preferred to d is a winner (for onstrutive) or suh that no andidate that d is
preferred to is a winner.
Note that if we have pries, we an not assume that the bribed voters ome last. We also
an not assume that we bribe the heapest voters, sine later voters have more power than
earlier voters, and so a more expensive later voter ould be a better hoie to bribe than
a heaper earlier voter. Still, we an solve the pried ases in polynomial time, by using
dynami programming. It is ruial that the sores for unweighted eletions are O(log n).
We want to ompute (s
1
; : : : ; s
m
; u; k) to be the minimum budget suh that if the
sore of 
i
before u is s
i
and there are k voters after u, the briber an aomplish their
goal. Note that there are a onstant number of votes for u and that all other numbers are
O(log n). Also note that (s
1
; : : : ; s
m
; u; k) is the minimum of the minimum budget needed
when u is bribed and the minimum budget needed when u is not bribed. To ompute the
minimum budget needed when u is bribed, ompute the minimum over all votes v and v
0
of (u) + (s
0
1
; : : : ; s
0
m
; v
0
; k   1), where s
0
i
is the sore of 
i
from all but the last k voters
when u is bribed to vote v. To ompute the minimum budget needed when u is not bribed,
ompute the minimum over all votes v
0
of (s
0
1
; : : : ; s
0
m
; v
0
; k   1), where s
0
i
is the sore of

i
from all but the last k voters when u is not bribed. ❑
In Veto, eah andidate sores a point when it is not ranked last in a vote and the
andidates with the most points are the winners. Now let's look at 3-andidate-Veto.
Theorem 5.6. 1. online-3-andidate-Veto-Bribery, online-3-andidate-Veto-Destrutive-
Bribery, online-3-andidate-Veto-$Bribery, and online-3-andidate-Veto-
Destrutive-$Bribery are in P.
2. online-3-andidate-Veto-Weighted-Bribery and online-3-andidate-Veto-Destrutive-
Weighted-Bribery are P
NP[1℄
-omplete.
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3. online-3-andidate-Veto-Weighted-$Bribery and online-3-andidate-Veto-
Destrutive-Weighted-$Bribery are P
NP[1℄
-hard and in 
p
2
(and we onjeture that
they are 
p
2
-omplete).
Proof. We look at dierent ases for the plaement of the designated andidate in the
preferene order a >

b >

. (Note that the polynomial-time ases also follow from
Theorem 5.5.)
 If d =  in the onstrutive ase or d = a in the destrutive ase, the problem is
trivial.
 If d = a in the onstrutive ase, we need to ensure that a is a winner, and if d = b
in the destrutive ase, we need to ensure that a is the unique winner. In both these
ases, the nonbribed voters veto a, no matter what. This means that the loation of
the bribed voters doesn't matter (though their pries and weights will). In the pried
ase, bribe the heapest voters (as many as possible within the budget) and bribe to
minimize the maximum sore of b and . So that's in P. The pried and weighted
(and so also the weighted) ase is in NP: Guess a set of voters to bribe, hek that
they are within the budget, guess votes for the bribed voters, and have all nonbribed
voters veto a. NP-hardness for the weighted ase follows from the NP-hardness for
weighted manipulation plus the proof of Theorem 5.1.
 If d = b in the onstrutive ase, the goal is to not have  win uniquely, and if d = 
in the destrutive ase, the goal is to have  not win. In this ase, all bribed voters
veto  (no matter what). The same argument as above shows that pried bribery is
in P.
The unpried, weighted ases are oNP-omplete. To show that the omplement is in
NP, pik the k heaviest voters to bribe. Then hek if you an partition the remaining
voters to veto a or b in suh a way that  wins uniquely in the onstrutive ase or
that  wins in the destrutive ase. Note that it is always best for the briber to bribe
the k heaviest voters: Swapping the weights of a lighter voter to be bribed with a
heavier voter not to be bribed will never make things worse for the briber. To show
hardness, note that the omplement is basially (the standard NP-omplete problem)
Partition.
To show the upper bound for the pried, weighted ase, note that we need to hek
that there exists a set of voters that an be bribed within the budget suh that if all
bribed voters veto , then for all votes for the nonbribed voters,  is not the unique
winner (in the onstrutive ase) or not a winner (in the destrutive ase). This
is learly in 
p
2
. With some are, we an show that it is in fat in 
p
2
. First use
an NP orale to determine the largest possible total weight (within the budget) of
bribed voters. Then determine whether we should bribe u, by using the orale again
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to determine the largest possible total weight (within the budget) of bribed voters,
assuming we bribe u. If that weight is the same as the previous weight, bribe u.
Otherwise, do not bribe u. Repeating this will give us a set of voters to bribe of
maximum weight. All these voters will veto . It remains to hek that for all votes
for the nonbribed voters,  is not the unique winner (in the onstrutive ase) or not
a winner (in the destrutive ase). This takes one more query to an NP orale.
Putting all ases together, the pried ase (and so also the unpried, unweighted ase)
is in P. The weighted ase is P
NP[1℄
-omplete, sine it an be written as the union of a
NP-omplete set and a oNP-omplete set that are P-separable.
9
The pried, weighted ase
inherits the P
NP[1℄
-hardness from the weighted ase (in fat, it already inherited this from
online manipulation, using Theorem 5.1), and it is in 
p
2
. ❑
We end this setion by looking at approval voting. In approval voting, eah an-
didate sores a point when it is approved in a vote and the andidates with the most
points are the winners. Though Approval-Bribery is NP-omplete [FHH09, Theorem 4.2℄,
we show that online-Approval-Bribery (and even online-Approval-Weighted-Bribery and
online-Approval-$Bribery) are in P. This implies that even for natural systems, bribery
an be harder than online bribery (assuming P 6= NP).
Theorem 5.7. 1. online-Approval-Bribery, online-Approval-Destrutive-Bribery, online-
Approval-$Bribery, online-Approval-Destrutive-$Bribery, online-Approval-
Weighted-Bribery, and online-Approval-Destrutive-Weighted-Bribery are eah in
P.
2. online-Approval-Weighted-$Bribery and online-Approval-Destrutive-Weighted-
$Bribery are eah NP-omplete.
Proof. The upper bounds are immediate from the observation that it is optimal for the
briber to have the bribed voters approve all desired andidates and to have the nonbribed
voters approve all other andidates. The NP-hardness for the pried, weighted ases follows
with the same redution as for the pried, weighted ases of online bribery for Plurality
from Theorem 5.4. ❑
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9
Two sets A and B are P-separable if there exists a set X omputable in polynomial time suh that
A  X  B (see [GS88℄).
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A Appendix: A Discussion of the Weighted Version of a Given Election
System
Let us disuss the issue of weighted versions of eletion systems, sine the issue is not
as straightforward as it might at rst seem. This is a somewhat rareed, model-foused
disussion, and the reader an safely skip this setion unless interested in the issue of
models|and an rest assured that the outome of the setion is that throughout this paper
we use the notion of weighted versions that is a ommon and intuitive one.
For natural systems, the weighted versions typially are already dened. In partiu-
lar, usually typial and natural is to treat eah weight-w vote as w unweighted opies of
that same vote, and to do whatever the unweighted system would do given that parti-
ular olletion of votes. Let us all this notion of an eletion system's weighted version
multipliity expansion. This is simply interpreting weights as what alled the \suint"
(e.g., [FHH09, FHHR09, HHR09, HH09℄ and many more)|as opposed to the standard, aka
\nonsuint"|version of an eletion's votes, whih is using binary numbers to represent
the number of opies.
The unweighted winner problem is in a stritly formal sense not a speial ase of the
dened-by-multipliity-expansion weighted winner problem, beause the types of the voters
dier (the former problem has no weights and the latter problem has weights). However,
the unweighted winner problem polynomial-time redues (and indeed redues even via
far more restritive redutions) to the dened-by-multipliity-expansion weighted winner
problem simply by the near-trivial ation of setting the weight of eah voter to be one. So
the unweighted winner problem is in eet never of greater omplexity than the dened-
by-multipliity-expansion weighted winner problem. In partiular, if for an eletion system
E the dened-by-multipliity-expansion weighted winner problem is in P, then so is the
unweighted winner problem for E .
Note, however, that sine the weights in our problems are in binary, the multipliity-
expansion approah means that we may be simulating the original system on an exponen-
tially long input. And so in this notion of weighted eletions it does not in general hold that
if an (unweighted) eletion system has a polynomial-time winner problem, then its weighted
version|dened by multipliity expansion in the way just mentioned|has a polynomial-
time winner problem. Indeed, it is very easy to make artiial examples of eletion systems
with polynomial-time winner problems where the winner problem of the weighted version
(as dened via multipliity expansion) is omplete for exponential time, i.e., is omplete
for E = [
>0
DTIME[2
n
℄.
10
Despite that, natural systems often have nie properties, and
10
For ompleteness, let us give an (admittedly artiial) onstrution of suh a ase. Let L
E
be any
problem that is omplete for E with respet to linear-time many-one redutions; it is well-known that E
has suh omplete sets, e.g., the natural universal set fhM; x; 0
k
i j M aepts input x within k stepsg
(see [Har78℄). Let E be the eletion system suh that if there is exatly one andidate||in the eletion,
and all voters in the eletion ast the same vote, and the number of voters is at least 2
jj
, then  wins if and
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in partiular, beautifully, for a wide variety of natural systems, their weighted versions
are dened by multipliity expansion yet those versions still have polynomial-time winner
problems. For example, the family of eletion systems known as Copeland and Llull ele-
tions [Cop51, MLC08℄ (see also, e.g., [FHHR09℄) has this property. Even more importantly,
so-alled soring systems have this property (basially beause, in their ase, instead of
doing an exponential number of additions one at a time, one an simply multiply). And,
for example, Setion 5 of this paper disusses a number of suh real-world systems, and
when speaking of their weighted versions is indeed doing so via multipliity expansion, and
in doing so, will in eah ase need to note that the thus-dened weighted version's winner
problem is in polynomial time.
In light of the previous paragraph, one still is left with the question: Should we (a) sim-
ply dene the weighted version of every eletion system to be what is dened by the
multipliity expansion approah above? Or (b) for eah eletion system, should eah au-
thor, using his or her human taste, hand-tailor, possibly in a quirky nonuniform way, what
he or she feels is a natural notion if its weighted version?
Both those approahes have advantages and downsides. We will disuss those, and
then|having made lear the downsides we are embraing|will in this paper adopt ap-
proah (a), namely, multipliity expansion. One disadvantage of multipliity expansion is
that as mentioned above it in some ases takes unweighted eletion systems whose win-
ner problems are in polynomial time and boosts the winner-problem omplexity of their
weighted versions as high as exponential time. But that is more a feature to be aware
of|and to avoid being bitten by due to forgetting that the feature might exist|than a
disadvantage. The only true disadvantages we know of regarding using multipliity expan-
sion as providing a general notion of interpreting weights in eletions are (i) the approah is
onating the issue of weights with the issue of suint representations, and in partiular
(ii) for a few natural eletion systems, the approah arguably gets things wrong (and we
will soon ome bak and disuss this \gets things wrong" in more detail). The advantage
of the multipliity-expansion approah is that it is usually highly natural, it is what almost
anyone would think of when asked what weight should be interpreted as, and it gives an
only if  2 L
E
. Here, we are viewing  as the bit-string naming that andidate, and jj denotes the number
of bits in that string. In all other ases, all andidates win. The unweighted winner problem for this eletion
system E is learly in P. However, note that the dened-by-multipliity-expansion weighted winner problem
of E is linear-time many-one omplete for E. Why? It learly is in E, sine (though this is overkill) one an
expand all weighted votes, that expansion transforms problem instanes of size n to problem instanes of size
at most 2
n
, and then one an aept if and only if the expanded instane is a member of the (polynomial-
time solvable) unweighted winner problem of E . But the dened-by-multipliity-expansion weighted winner
problem of E is also many-one linear-time hard for E, sine L
E
redues to it by the many-one linear-time
redution that maps from x to an eletion with one andidate, whose name is x, and with one voter, whose
weight is 
0
jxj, where 
0
is the smallest natural number suh that L
E
2 DTIME[2

0
n
℄ (suh a 
0
exists by
the denition of E and the fat that L
E
2 E). Thus, the dened-by-multipliity-expansion weighted winner
problem of E is many-one linear-time omplete for E, despite the fat that the unweighted winner problem
for E belongs to P.
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aross-the-board, uniform approah to weight, rather than having the notion be a system-
by-system, ad ho, argued-and-debated onstrut. Turning to alternative (b), sine human
tastes dier, alternative (b)'s worst downside is that in the extreme one might be just
basially hand in the weights to an eletion system's omputation funtion and let it do
whatever it feels like with them|making them just information/bits it an use, perhaps in
utterly unnatural ways. That the denition of weight may not math what people broadly
feel that weight means, and also (aside from the promise that the humans hand-dening
the weighted versions of eah system are using their taste) this approah does nothing to
ensure that the weighted version of an eletion systems has any onnetion whatsoever to
the system's unweighted version. In light of this, throughout this paper we outright dene,
for any (unweighted) eletion system E , the weighted version of E (whih via overloading we
will also sometimes desribe as E|the inputs to the system though will make lear whih
version we are speaking of, sine in one ase there are no weights and in the other ase
there are) via multipliity expansion.
It might seem strange for any paper to take a dierent approah to what \weighted"
means. Indeed, the literature's papers are generally taking the multipliity-expansion ap-
proah to weight as so natural and ompelling that they simply are employing it, generally
without mentioning it or mentioning why they are using it. However, to further disuss
this, let us briey ome bak to the worst weakness of the hoie we made, namely, that
there are ases where this approah arguably \gets things wrong." In partiular, the fat
that the approah onates suintness with weight means that the indivisibility of a vote
is being shattered. Yet this is a severe problem for eletion systems that are very foused on
ations aeting individual votes. For example, a famous eletion system known as Dodgson
eletions [Dod76℄ is based on the number of sequential exhanges of adjaent preferenes
within voters needed to make a given andidate beome \a Condoret winner" [Con85℄,
i.e., a andidate who beats eah other andidate in pairwise head-on-head eletions. The
multipliity-expansion approah would allow, for a example, some unweighted opies of a
given weighted vote to have an exhange made in them while other unweighted opies of that
same weighted vote didn't have the exhange made in them; yet that seems not to respet
the spirit of Dodgson's system. (If one were hand-dening a notion of weight for Dodgson's
system, it is simply not lear whether for a weight i voter, now viewed as utterly indivisible,
one would want to view an adjaent-andidates exhange as one exhange or w
i
exhanges.
Eah ould be argued for, and so there are at least two quite dierent, quite reasonable
notions of hand-dened weightedness for Dodgson eletion.) In Young eletions [You77℄,
whih are dened based on how few deletions of voters are needed to make a given andidate
a (\weak," but let us not here worry about that distintion) Condoret winner, a similar
issue ours|similar both in the diÆulty and in the fat that there are, in a hand-built
notion of weight for the problem, two quite dierent notions that reasonable people ould
disagree on as to whih is more appropriate. To the best of our knowledge, the issue of
how to frame weighted Dodgson and weighted Young has been touhed on only one in
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the literature, namely, it is disussed in the tehnial-report version of a paper of Fitzsim-
mons and Hemaspaandra [FH16℄, although not in the later versions of that same paper.
That paper provides a valuable disussion of many of the issues disussed in this setion,
and we highly ommend it to the reader. Interestingly, that paper nds only one natu-
ral eletion system for whih the weighted (in the sense of multipliity expansion) winner
problem an even onditionally be shown to be of greater omplexity than the unweighted
winner problem, namely, the paper shows that to be the ase for the system known as
Kemeny eletions [Kem59℄|whih are a ase where the natural interpretation of weights is
via multipliity expansion (see [FH16℄)|if a ertain omplexity-theoreti onjeture holds
(namely, that there are sets aeptable via sequential aess to NP that are not aeptable
via parallel aess to NP). (In ontrast, footnote 10 of the present paper onstruts a ase
where the weighted version of a problem is, unonditionally, of greater omplexity than its
unweighted version.) The system Single Transferable Vote (see, e.g., [BO91℄) has similar
issues to those of Dodgson and Young eletions, as to how to dene weight for it.
To be lear, we are not suggesting that multipliity expansion aptures the right notion
of weightedness for suh systems as Dodgson's, Young's, or Single Transferable Vote. It
does not, and papers studying those in weighted ontexts should not employ multipliity
expansion as their notion of weight. However, what we are saying is that multipliity expan-
sion is the best uniform, general approah to weight, and so we use it here|while arefully
making sure not to apply it to ases suh as Dodgson eletions where it is not a good t,
and making sure to always be aware that multipliity expansion an distort the omplex-
ity of winner problems and that one must for whatever ases one overs make sure not to
asually assume otherwise. We refer the reader to the work of Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaan-
dra [FH16, FH19℄ for further disussion of, and results on, weights/suintness/multiply
in eletions.
As a nal omment, we stress that our denition regarding how the winner problem is
dened for the weighted version of an (unweighted) eletion system in no way is something
that binds the denitions of manipulative ations within those systems. Those ations and
their osts are dened not by the winner-problem handling but rather by the manipulative
ations themselves, e.g., in bribery of pried, weighted eletions, the prie of a weighted
voter is the ost of bribing that partiular voter (i.e., the weighted vote bribes or fails to
be bribed as a single unit).
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